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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against

defendant/appellant Prime Commercial, Inc. ("Prime"), on its counterclaim for a
portion of the money earned by plaintiff/appellee Brent D. Mitchell ("Mitchell") for
real estate development activities, when Mitchell agreed that any employment he
obtained in connection with the real estate business would be taken in Prime's name.
(Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 828-29.)
In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, all facts and inferences
are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party (Prime), and no deference
is given either to the trial court's factual conclusions or to its legal conclusions.
Coulter & Smith. Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998); Badger v. Brooklyn
Canal Co.. 922 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1996).

2.

Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against Prime

on its counterclaim for damages arising from transactions Mitchell made with Prime's
former clients after being terminated from Prime, when Mitchell had agreed not to use
"any information or materials gained for or from the files or business of [Prime]."
(Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 830-32.)
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The standard of review is the same as that for issue number one, above.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Not applicable.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case
Defendant/appellant Prime Commercial, Inc., appeals from an order of the
Honorable Anne M. Stirba, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, granting
summary judgment against Prime on its counterclaim against plaintiff/appellee Brent D.
Mitchell for breach of contract. (Order on Summary Judgment, R. 929-37, Addendum
Exhibit ("Add. Ex.") 1.) After the trial court ruled that Prime's counterclaim would be
dismissed, the parties stipulated to a final judgment resolving all claims (Order and
Judgment, R. 926-28), and this timely appeal followed (Notice of Appeal, R. 943-45).

Course of Proceedings
Mitchell, a real estate agent, filed his complaint against Prime, a real estate
brokerage, on September 13, 1995, alleging that Prime breached an agreement with
Mitchell and claiming outstanding commissions of $20,544.69. (Complaint, R. 001011.) On October 12, 1995, Prime answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim
for damages for Mitchell's breaches of the same agreement.
Counterclaim, R. 032-37.)

(Answer and

In particular, Prime sought recovery of (a) proceeds
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Mitchell had received for real estate development activities he had engaged in while
employed by Prime, and (b) commissions Mitchell received for real estate transactions
he engaged in with Prime's former clients after he was terminated by Prime. (Counterclaim 1! 6-7, R. 036.) On April 19, 1996, Mitchell moved for partial summary judgment on Prime's counterclaims. (R. 226-306.) After additional time for discovery,
Prime filed its opposition to this motion on May 4, 1998 (R. 822-905), and Mitchell
filed a reply memorandum on May 6, 1998 (R. 906-19). A hearing took place on May
8, 1998, at which time the court orally ruled that the motion for partial summary
judgment would be granted. (Transcript, R. 955.) A final Order and Judgment was
entered on June 3, 1998 (R. 926-27), and two days later, the trial court entered its
Order on Summary Judgment (R. 929-37, Add. Ex. 1). Prime's notice of appeal was
filed on July 1, 1998 (R. 943-45).
On August 3, 1998, Mitchell filed a motion for summary disposition. Prime
filed its own motion for summary disposition on August 20, 1998. On September 4,
1998, the Utah Supreme Court entered an order pouring the case over to the Court of
Appeals, and on September 15, 1998, this Court entered an order denying both motions
and deferring consideration of the issues until plenary presentation of the case.

Statement of Facts
Prime Commercial, Inc., is a real estate broker licensed to do business in Utah.
(Agreement, R. 858, Add. Ex. 2.) In approximately January 1992, Prime hired Brent
D. Mitchell to act as a real estate agent affiliated with Prime. (PL's Supp. Answers to

-3-

Def.'s First Set of Interrogatories, R. 890.) At that time, Mitchell had a real estate
agent's license, but he had no experience in the real estate business. (Deposition of
Steve Urry, R. 836:7-22, Add. Ex. 3.) Prime's principal Steve Urry therefore worked
closely with Mitchell, teaching him the ins and outs of the real estate business. (IcL R.
836:16 - 837:18.) Mr. Urry provided Mitchell with lists of potential clients, including
potential sellers of income property and apartment property owners Mitchell could use
for "cold calling." (Id, R. 836:22 - 837:3.) Mr. Urry also showed Mitchell how to
write an earnest money offer, how to do an investment analysis of income property,
and how to talk to clients about developing projects. (IcL R. 837:3-13.)
Mitchell was also a member and manager of Red Point Equities, L.C. ("Red
Point"). (Affidavit of Brent D. Mitchell 11 1-2, R. 297-98, Add. Ex. 4.) In 1994,
while Mitchell was employed by Prime, Mitchell used Red Point to enter into an agreement with Mr. Leonard K. M. Fong to pursue "real estate development activities."
(Id. 12.) More specifically, Red Point and Mr. Fong agreed to purchase a parcel of
real estate from third parties, develop it, and sell individual parcels to other third
parties.

(IcL 11 3-6, R. 298.) Mitchell, through Red Point, ended up receiving

$15,000 for his dealings with Mr. Fong. (Id, 1 9, R. 299.)
On January 1, 1994, Prime and Mitchell had entered into a written agreement
setting forth the terms of their association. (Agreement, R. 858-64, Add. Ex. 2.)
Paragraph eleven of this agreement specifically provided that all of Mitchell1 s real
estate work would be done through Prime:
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In accordance with law, Agent agrees that any and all listings of property,
and all employment in connection with the real estate business shall be
taken in the name of Broker.
(Id. 1 11, R. 860.) The agreement also required commissions from real estate activities
to be split according to a specific formula set forth in the contract. (Id, 1 6, R. 859.)
Nevertheless, Mitchell did not inform Prime about the Fong project. One of Prime's
secretaries, however, noticed that Mitchell had been using Prime's letterhead and
secretarial staff in furtherance of his activities, and she told Mr. Urry. (Urry Dep., R.
845:7-15, Add. Ex. 3.) Mr. Urry discussed the matter with Mitchell, and Mitchell
agreed that what he was doing was wrong, and that Prime should have been involved in
the project. (KL R. 845:16 - 846:1, 847:14-21.) Mitchell therefore agreed that Prime
would be paid half of the commissions and/or profits Mitchell received from the Fong
project. (IcL R- 845:22-24.) However, Mitchell later reneged on this agreement and
refused to pay Prime its share of the proceeds received from Mr. Fong. (IcL R. 845:24
-846:1.)
On approximately August 31, 1994, Prime terminated Mitchell's employment.
(Id. R. 844:14-20.) Paragraph eighteen of the Mitchell-Prime agreement specifically
precluded Mitchell from using information and materials obtained through his association with Prime:
Agent shall not, after termination of this Agreement, use to Agent's own
advantage, or to the advantage of any other person or corporation, any
information or materials gained for or from the files or business of
Broker.

(Agreement 1 18, R. 861, Add. Ex. 2.) Nevertheless, Mitchell engaged in numerous
real estate transactions with Prime's clients after being terminated. (Mitchell Dep., R.
879:1-23, 881:7 - 882:9, 883:5-24, 884:3-14, 885:25 - 886:2, Add. Ex. 5; Plaintiff's
Supp. Answers to Interrogatories 1 6, R. 891-98; Urry Dep., R. 849:2-23, Add. Ex.
3.) In his deposition, Mitchell admitted that he learned of the existence of at least three
clients, and of the properties they were selling, through his work at Prime. (Mitchell
Dep., R. 879:4-23, 881:7-25, 882:3-9.)

Mitchell also admitted that he had used

financial statements and other information obtained from his work at Prime. (IcL 881:925.) At the time of his termination, Mitchell was also in possession of a computergenerated list of prospective apartment sellers that Prime had previously compiled at its
own expense. (Urry Dep., R. 856:8-17.)
Prime's counterclaim against Mitchell sought setoffs under two theories. First,
Prime sought a setoff for its share of the money Mitchell earned from the Fong project,
which he had engaged in while supposedly working exclusively for Prime. Prime
sought recovery under paragraph eleven of the agreement, quoted earlier, in which
Mitchell agreed that all employment in connection with the real estate business would
be taken on behalf of Prime. Second, Prime sought damages for Mitchell's breach of
paragraph eighteen of the agreement, in which Mitchell agreed not to use Prime's
materials for his own benefit.

Prime requested that it be paid a portion of the

commissions Mitchell earned from the transactions he completed in violation of
paragraph eighteen.
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In his motion for partial summary judgment on Prime's counterclaim, Mitchell
asserted that both of Prime's claims were barred by the agreement. Regarding the
Fong project, Mitchell did not present any evidence or argument that his real estate
development activities did not constitute "employment in connection with the real estate
business" under paragraph eleven of the agreement.

(Memorandum in Support of

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 235-37.) Instead, Mitchell claimed in his
affidavit that (1) his Fong activities were "independent of" his broker-agent relationship
with Prime, (2) there was no listing agreement in connection with the Fong project, (3)
the money he received from the Fong project was for his joint venture interest, and not
for commissions on the sale of units, and (4) his work on the Fong project did not
involve any of the activities mentioned in paragraph four of the agreement. (Mitchell
Aff. 11 2, 5, 9, 10, R. 297-99, Add. Ex. 4.) Paragraph four of the agreement states as
follows:
Until termination of this Agreement, Agent agrees to work diligently and
use Agent's best efforts to sell, lease, or rent any and all real estate listed
with Broker, to solicit additional listings and customers for Broker and
otherwise promote the business of serving the public in real estate
transactions to the end that each of the parties to this Agreement may
derive the greatest profit possible, provided that nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to require Agent to handle or solicit
particular listings or authorize Broker to direct or require that Agent do
so. Agent agrees to perform no other activities in association with
Broker, except to solicit and obtain listings and sales, leases,
representation agreements or management contracts] of property, for the
parties' mutual benefit, and to do so in accordance with law and the
ethical and professional standards as required in Paragraph 5 of this
Agreement.
(Agreement 1 4, R. 859, Add. Ex. 2.)
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Regarding Prime's claim for the post-termination commissions Mitchell earned
from transactions with Prime's customers, Mitchell did not deny violating paragraph
eighteen of the agreement by using "information or materials gained for or from the
files or business of Broker." Mitchell could testify only that he did not receive commissions from three specific listings that were active when he was terminated by Prime.
(Mitchell Aff. 11 11-15, R. 299-300, Add. Ex. 4.) Mitchell asserted instead that
paragraph eighteen was unenforceable because it was a covenant not to compete, and
because it lacked any explicit geographical or time limitations.

(Memorandum in

Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 237-39.)
In its opposition to the summary judgment motion, Prime pointed out that the
agreement specifically required Mitchell to take all "employment in connection with the
real estate business" in Prime's name, and Prime submitted evidence from two
witnesses explaining that the real estate "development" activities involved in the Fong
project constituted employment in connection with the real estate business, and was
therefore subject to paragraph eleven of the agreement.

(Urry Dep., R. 838:11 -

842:15, Add. Ex. 3; Affidavit of William K. Martin 1 4, R. 876-77, Add. Ex. 6.)
Prime also pointed out that Mitchell had expressly agreed to pay Prime half of the Fong
proceeds.
Finally, Prime explained that paragraph eighteen was not a "covenant not to
compete" because it did not require Mitchell to refrain from competing. (Memorandum
in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 831.) Prime also presented
evidence of Mitchell's post-termination real estate transactions with Prime's clients, and
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Prime presented evidence that the standard in the real estate industry generally requires
a real estate agent to compensate a former broker for transactions made with that
broker's clients for up to a year after termination. (Urry Dep., R. 849:24 - 855:20,
Add. Ex. 3; Martin Aff. 11 5-8, R. 877-78, Add. Ex. 6.)
The trial court granted both portions of Mitchell's motion for partial summary
judgment. (Order on Summary Judgment, R. 929-37, Add. Ex. 1.) The court concluded that Mitchell's duties were limited to those addressed in paragraph four of the
agreement, i.e., soliciting and obtaining listings and sales, leases, representation agreements and management contracts. (Id, 1 2, R. 935.) The court therefore held that
Prime was not entitled to recover any of the proceeds from the Fong project. (Id 1 4,
R. 935-36.) The court did not address paragraph eleven of the agreement at all. (See
id) The court further concluded that paragraph eighteen constituted a total prohibition
on competition from Mitchell, and was unenforceable because it did not contain an
explicit time or geographical limitation. (Id 11 5-7, R. 936.) Finally, the court also
concluded that the agreement itself was an integrated contract and was unambiguous.
(Id 11 1,4, 5,6, R. 935-36.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in both portions of its summary judgment ruling. First, the
court erred in dismissing Prime's claim for its share of the Fong proceeds under
paragraph eleven of the parties' agreement. The plain language of paragraph eleven
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required Mitchell to take "all employment in connection with the real estate business"
in Prime's name, and real estate development activities clearly constitute employment
in connection with the real estate business.

Whether the real estate development

activities were specifically mentioned in paragraph four is irrelevant, because Prime is
not relying on paragraph four as its basis for relief. Moreover, there is nothing in the
contract that states or implies that the list of activities mentioned in paragraph four was
meant to be a limitation on paragraph eleven. At the very least, it is reasonable to
conclude that "employment in connection with the real estate business" includes
Mitchell's real estate development activities, and therefore the agreement is ambiguous,
and summary judgment is inappropriate.
Similarly, the trial court erred in refusing to enforce Mitchell's agreement not to
use materials and other information obtained from Prime's files.

The trial court

concluded that paragraph eighteen constituted a blanket covenant not to compete, but
this conclusion was incorrect, as nothing in paragraph eighteen prevents Mitchell from
competing with Prime.

Instead, paragraph eighteen merely provides that Mitchell

cannot use Prime's customer list and other proprietary materials for Mitchell's own
benefit. Such a limited restriction is clearly enforceable under Utah law. At any rate,
as with paragraph eleven, the issue here is simply whether Prime's proposed interpretation of paragraph eighteen is reasonable; if it is reasonable to read paragraph
eighteen simply as a limitation on Mitchell's use of specific information, the summary
judgment must be reversed.
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Because paragraph eighteen is not a covenant not to compete, the fact that it
lacks express geographical or durational limitations does not render it unenforceable.
In addition, even if such limitations were required, they should be implied into the
contract based on the inherent nature of the restrictions and the course of dealing of the
real estate industry, as Utah law clearly requires that contractual provisions be construed wherever possible so as to make them enforceable. Finally, even if paragraph
eighteen must as a matter of law be construed as a covenant not to compete, the
provision should be enforced to the extent the covenant is reasonable, and the
agreement certainly is reasonable as applied in this instance.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIME WAS NOT
ENTITLED TO A PORTION OF THE COMMISSIONS MITCHELL EARNED
FROM HIS REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES
Pursuant to paragraph eleven of the parties' agreement, Prime Commercial was
entitled to a portion of the commissions Mitchell earned through Red Point Equities
from the real estate development activities he undertook with Mr. Fong. Paragraph
eleven required all employment in connection with the real estate business to be taken
in Prime's name, and Mitchell's development activities plainly constituted employment
in connection with the real estate business. Paragraph four of the agreement does not
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require a contrary result. Therefore, the grant of summary judgment on this portion of
Prime's counterclaim should be reversed.
A.

The grant of summary judgment must be reversed as long as the agreement
can reasonably be construed in Prime's favor.
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper only if

the moving party establishes "[1] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and [2] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(c). For summary judgment to be proper, the moving party must submit sufficient
evidence or otherwise establish its right to judgment. The moving party has an "affirmative burden," Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp.. 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1993),
and if the moving party fails to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact
exists, the motion must be denied. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752
(Utah 1996) (because moving party's affidavit failed to negate existence of disputed
issue of fact, nonmoving party had no burden to present evidence in response on that
issue); see also Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. Co.. Case No. 970569, slip op. at
(Utah Dec. 29, 1998) (because moving party did not present evidence on key issue,
"there remain disputed issues of material fact and summary judgment is not
appropriate").
Therefore, Prime is not required to prove that the trial court's interpretation of
the agreement is incorrect, or even that the court's interpretation of the agreement is
unreasonable. Instead, Prime need only show that its own interpretation of the agreement is reasonable. If there is a reasonable construction of the agreement that would
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enable Prime to recover, then the grant of summary judgment would have to be reversed, even if the trial court's interpretation were also reasonable. If an agreement is
subject to two reasonable or tenable interpretations, then the agreement is ambiguous,
and the trial court must consider extrinsic evidence in determining the meaning actually
intended by the parties.1 E.g., R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus.. 936 P.2d
1068, 1074 (Utah 1997). In other words, because the agreement is reasonably susceptible to Prime's reading, Mitchell has not established that he is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. See, e.g.. id. (quoting Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292,
1293 (Utah 1983)) ("'[A] motion for summary judgment may not be granted if a legal
conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists in the contract and there is a factual issue
as to what the parties intended.'").
B.

Mitchell's real estate development activities were required to be taken in
Prime's name under paragraph eleven of the agreement.
Prime's argument on this point is quite simple: (1) Paragraph eleven of the

agreement unequivocally requires Mitchell to take "all employment in connection with
the real estate business" in Prime's name. (Agreement 1 11, R. 860, Add. Ex. 2.) (2)
Mitchell's real estate development activities constituted employment in connection with
the real estate business. Therefore, (3) paragraph eleven of the agreement required
Mitchell's development activities to be taken in Prime's name. Prime is therefore
entitled to its share of the proceeds from the development activities.
1

Of course, if Prime's interpretation is the only reasonable one (i.e., if the trial
court's reading is unreasonable), then Prime's interpretation must control as a matter of
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C.

Paragraph four of the agreement does not prevent Prime from recovering its
share of the commissions and proceeds earned by Mitchell from the Fong
project.
The trial court never directly addressed whether real estate development activ-

ities constitute "employment in connection with the real estate business" under paragraph eleven of the agreement. Indeed, the trial court's conclusions of law do not even
mention paragraph eleven.

(Order on Summary Judgment, R. 935-36, Addendum

Exhibit 1.) Instead, the trial court denied Prime its right to commissions because it
concluded that Mitchell's activities were not included within the purview of paragraph
four of the agreement, in which Mitchell agreed "to perform no other activities in
association with Broker, except to solicit and obtain listings and sales, leases, representation agreements or management contracts] of property." (Agreement f 4, R.
859, Add. Ex. 2.) The trial court apparently reasoned that the list of activities presented in paragraph four defines "employment in connection with the real estate business" as that phrase appears in paragraph eleven, so that any activities outside the scope
of paragraph four would necessarily fall outside the scope of paragraph eleven.
As discussed in subsection A above, Prime is not required to prove that the trial
court's interpretation is incorrect, or even that such an interpretation is unreasonable.
Instead, as the party opposing summary judgment, Prime need only show that its own
interpretation of the agreement is reasonable. That is, as long as it would be reasonable
to conclude that Mitchell's development activities constituted "employment in connec-

law, and the summary judgment still would have to be reversed.
-14-

tion with the real estate business" under the agreement, the summary judgment will
have to be reversed.
1.

The plain language of the agreement demonstrates that Prime's
interpretation of the agreement is reasonable.

Prime submits that its interpretation of the agreement, that real estate development activities constitute "employment in connection with the real estate business," is
clearly reasonable. First, regardless of what may appear in paragraph four, the plain
language of paragraph eleven itself obviously covers Mitchell's "development" activities.

Real estate development consists of things such as buying real property,

improving real property, managing real property, and selling or leasing real property.
All of these activities are plainly connected to the real estate business. Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine how real estate development could not be considered employment in
connection with the real estate business. It must certainly at least be reasonable to
interpret a contract according to its plain meaning.
As noted above, the trial court apparently concluded that the list of activities in
paragraph four was intended as a definition of "real estate business" in paragraph
eleven, and that only those transactions specifically listed in paragraph four constitute
"employment in connection with the real estate business." But neither the language nor
the structure of the agreement support this interpretation.

Or, more importantly,

nothing in the language or structure of the agreement requires such an interpretation.
To the contrary, the "all employment" language used in paragraph eleven is much
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broader than the specific language used in paragraph four, and it is reasonable to
conclude that because different language was used, different coverage was intended.
2.

Logic and fairness also support Prime's proposed interpretation of
paragraph eleven.

In addition, there are perfectly good reasons why paragraph eleven would be
intended to have a broader meaning than paragraph four. First, a broader paragraph
eleven is necessary to balance out the obligations imposed by the agreement. Without
paragraph eleven, the parties' obligations under the agreement are tilted heavily in the
agent's favor.

Under the agreement, the broker is obligated to give the agent all

current listings, as well as all prospective listings if the agent wishes. (Agreement 1 1,
R. 858, Add. Ex. 2.) The broker also must provide the agent with any "advice,
information, and full cooperation" the agent requests. (IdL 12.) The broker is even
required to provide the agent with office facilities. (IcL 1 3, R. 859.)
However, the broker has almost no control over the agent. The broker may not
require an agent to service a particular listing or call on a particular client, and the
broker has no right to direct the agent's working hours, floor time, or vacation time.
(Id. fl 1, 2, 4, R. 858-59.) In other words, the broker is required to provide a great
deal of support, but the agent is not obligated to do anything in return. Indeed, the
agent is even free to decide not to work at all. Thus, the only consideration the broker
receives in exchange for the support it provides is the right to receive a share of the
commissions from any employment the agent undertakes in connection with the real
estate business.
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The broader scope of paragraph eleven also reduces uncertainty regarding the
parties' obligations and may help protect a broker from fraud or sharp practices
committed by an unscrupulous agent. If a broker's right to payment were strictly
limited to the narrow list of transactions set forth in paragraph four, then an agent could
avoid sharing his or her commissions simply by structuring transactions in a certain
way. A great deal of litigation would ensue over whether a certain transaction constituted a "listing," a "sale," or some other arrangement. However, a broader paragraph eleven makes the parties' contractual obligations much clearer and provides less
of an opportunity or a temptation for an agent to attempt to defraud his or her broker.
As long a transaction constitutes "employment in connection with the real estate
business," the proceeds must be shared with the broker.
3.

Prime's extrinsic evidence also establishes that Prime's proposed
interpretation of paragraph eleven is reasonable.

Finally, the extrinsic evidence submitted to the trial court by Prime also supports
Prime's reading of the agreement. The Utah Supreme Court has held that extrinsic
evidence must be considered in determining whether a party's proposed interpretation
of a contract is reasonable, even if the contract appears unambiguous on its face. Ward
v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264, 267-68 (Utah 1995). As the court
explained, "[w]hen determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence
must be considered." Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
Two witnesses with experience in the real estate industry directly testified that
real estate development constitutes employment in connection with the real estate bus-
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iness and is covered by paragraph eleven of the agreement. (Urry Dep., R. 838:11 839:4, 840:9 - 841:1, 841:18 - 842:15, 843:1-25, Add. Ex. 3; Martin Aff. 1 4, R. 87677. Add. Ex. 6.) Further, Mitchell himself even acknowledged that his real estate
development activities were covered by the agreement and that Prime was entitled to a
portion of the profits he was making through those activities. (Urry Dep., R. 845:3 846:16, 847:14-21.) This evidence, along with the plain language of paragraph eleven
itself, demonstrates that the agreement is at least "reasonably susceptible" to Primefs
interpretation, and that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Prime is entitled to a
portion of the money Mitchell received from his real estate development activities with
Fong.
D.

The grant of summary judgment on this portion of Prime's counterclaim
should be reversed.
Ultimately, paragraph four is irrelevant. That is, it does not matter whether

Mitchell agreed in paragraph four to engage in real estate activities other than soliciting
or obtaining listings and sales, or even whether paragraph four required Mitchell to
refrain from engaging in these other activities. The fact remains that Mitchell clearly
did engage in other activities connected to the real estate business. The fact also
remains that Mitchell agreed that "all" employment he obtained in connection with the
real estate business would be taken in Prime's name. Therefore, Prime is entitled to a
fair share of the money Mitchell earned from his development activities.
Allowing the summary judgment to stand would sanction an injustice. When
Mitchell, who had no previous real estate experience, was hired by Prime, he agreed to

-18-

take all real estate employment in Prime's name, and to ensure that Prime received its
share of the commissions earned in such activities. Instead, while working at Prime's
office and while using Prime's facilities, Mitchell attempted to engage in "independent"
real estate activities for his own personal profit, without sharing with Prime. When
Prime found out about it, Mitchell then promised that he would in fact split the proceeds with Prime, just as he had originally agreed when he signed the contract. Then,
Mitchell turned around and refused to live up to his word.

Enough is enough.

Mitchell's activities were clearly governed by paragraph eleven of his agreement with
Prime, and as such he was required to involve Prime in those activities. At the very
least, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether those activities fall within the
contract. Either way, the summary judgment on this point should be reversed.

POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENFORCE MITCHELLS
AGREEMENT NOT TO USE MATERIALS AND OTHER INFORMATION
OBTAINED FROM PRIMES FILES AND BUSINESS
The trial court also erred in holding that Mitchell was free to use the customer
lists and other proprietary information he obtained from Prime, notwithstanding
Mitchell's express agreement not to do so. In paragraph eighteen of the agreement,
Mitchell agreed that he would not
use to [his] own advantage, or to the advantage of any other person or
corporation, any information or materials gained for or from the files or
business of [Prime].

-19-

(Agreement 1 18, R. 861, Add. Ex. 2 (emphasis added).) Nevertheless, Mitchell flagrantly disregarded this provision and engaged in numerous real estate transactions with
Prime's clients after being terminated by Prime. (Mitchell Dep., R. 879:1-23, 881:7 882:9, 883:5-24, 884:3 - 14, 885:25 - 886:2, Add. Ex. 5; Plaintiffs Supp. Answers to
Interrogatories 1 6, R. 891-98; Urry Dep., R. 849:2-23, Add. Ex. 3.)2
The trial court held that Prime was not entitled to any relief for Mitchell's
breach of paragraph eighteen, concluding that paragraph eighteen was a covenant not to
compete and was unenforceable on the ground that it lacked any explicit time or geographical limitations. This characterization is erroneous, however; paragraph eighteen
is not a covenant not to compete, because it does not restrict competition. Instead,
paragraph eighteen simply prevents Mitchell from using specific proprietary information developed by Prime, and restrictions such as these are plainly enforceable. The
trial court's grant of summary judgment on this point should therefore be reversed.
A.

A restriction on contacting an employer's former customers is enforceable,
even in situations where a covenant not to compete would be barred.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an employee may be prevented from

using customer leads gained from a former employer, even in situations where a
covenant not to compete would be unenforceable. Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623,
625-27 (Utah 1982). In Robbins. a hearing aid salesman was given a list of prospects

2

Mitchell admitted that, through his work at Prime, he learned of the existence
of clients, the properties they were selling, and their financial statements and other
information. (Mitchell Dep., R. 879:4-23, 881:7-25, 882:3-9.) Mitchell also had a
copy of Prime's list of potential clients. (Urry Dep., R. 856:8-17.)
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by his employer, and he signed an agreement stating that he would use that list only for
the employer's business. The agreement further provided that if he used the list "for
any other purpose to the detriment or damage of the Company," he would be liable for
five thousand dollars in liquidated damages. IdL at 624 n.l.

The agreement also

included a provision preventing the employee from selling hearing aids in the areas serviced by the employer in Utah within one year of terminating his employment, subject
to liquidated damages of three thousand dollars. Id. n.2.
The employee subsequently opened his own business selling hearing aids, and he
sold hearing aids to persons who had been identified as potential customers by his
employer. The trial court held that the employee was liable for the $5000 liquidated
damages for using the customer leads and $3000 for violating the noncompetition
provision.

The supreme court reversed the award of damages for violating the

covenant not to compete, finding that the covenant was unenforceable because the
salesman was engaged in a "common calling." IdL at 627-28. However, the court
affirmed the award of damages for the employee's use of the customer leads, finding
that the liquidated damage amount did not constitute an improper penalty. Id. at 62527. The court specifically recognized that, to some extent, the customer leads "were in
the nature of trade secrets due to the time, expense, and effort which went into
discovering the leads." Id. at 628.
In a recent case remarkably similar to our own, the Alaska Supreme Court has
held that a contractual provision prohibiting an agent from contacting a broker's clients
is enforceable even if the provision is not expressly limited in time or in area. Metcalfe
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Investments. Inc. v. Garrison, 919 P.2d 1356 (Alaska 1996).3 In Metcalfe, the court
upheld a real estate agent's oral agreement to refrain from doing business with potential
buyers whom she first met through her employment. The president of the brokerage
testified that he and the agent had orally agreed that the agent would refrain from
contacting the brokerage's customers after her departure. This oral agreement did not
have a geographical or time limitation, though the broker later testified that he
"assumed" the limitation would last for one year. The agent eventually left the brokerage and opened up her own business, where she sold real estate to at least five of the
brokerage's clients. The trial court granted summary judgment for the former agent,
holding that the agreement was too vague to be enforceable.
The Alaska Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Most significantly, the court
expressly held that the agreement was not rendered unenforceable by the lack of a
geographical or time limitation, because the agreement did not restrict competition.
Instead, the court explained that the agreement merely prevented the agent from
exploiting the brokerage's information and customers:
[T]his agreement is enforceable without such [geographical and time]
limits. This is not the type of noncompetition agreement that courts
typically see, limiting a former employee's ability to engage in a trade or
profession within a given area for some period of time. Instead, it is an
agreement that left Garrison free to set up a carbon copy of Metcalfe
Investments right down the street if she wished. The only thing she was
prohibited from doing was expropriating information and customers that
Metcalfe Investments had procured at its own expense. Thus the lack of
geographical limitation is irrelevant because the covenant was not a
blanket prohibition on competition, but rather a selective restraint on

3

A copy of this opinion is included at Addendum Exhibit 7.
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doing business with people who were potential Metcalfe Investments
customers at the time of her termination.
Id. at 1361 (emphasis added).

The court also held that the oral agreement was

sufficiently definite to be enforceable, and that it did not injure the public interest.
B.

Paragraph eighteen is simply a limitation on the use of Prime's proprietary
information, not a covenant not to compete, so explicit geographical and
durational limitations are not required.
Paragraph eighteen's plain language demonstrates that it is not an unenforceable

covenant not to compete. There is nothing in paragraph eighteen preventing Mitchell
from working for another real estate broker or otherwise engaging in the real estate
industry, either in Utah or elsewhere. Instead, paragraph eighteen prevents Mitchell
from using specific "information and materials" obtained from Prime.

Just as in

Metcalfe. Mitchell was perfectly free to set up a carbon copy of Prime right down the
street; he was simply required to do so without using Prime's own materials.
As with the first issue discussed in this brief, this issue involves competing
contractual interpretations. Therefore, as the nonmoving party, Prime need only show
that paragraph eighteen can reasonably be interpreted as being enforceable.

Once

again, Prime is not required to prove that the trial court's reading was unreasonable;
instead, Prime merely needs to show that Prime's own reading of paragraph eighteen,
i.e., as a prohibition on using customer lists, is tenable. R & R Energies. 936 P.2d at
1074. If Prime's reading is tenable, then the provision is ambiguous, and summary
judgment is inappropriate. Id.
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Of course, it may be possible to read paragraph eighteen as a blanket prohibition
on competition. That is, a court could determine that "information" gained from the
"business" of employer includes general knowledge about the real estate business, and
that therefore a prohibition on use of that information would prevent Mitchell from
engaging in the real estate business altogether. Ct Robbins. 645 P.2d at 628 ("General
knowledge or expertise acquired through employment in a common calling cannot be
appropriated as a trade secret").

The trial court apparently interpreted paragraph

eighteen in exactly this fashion. However, Prime submits that this construction is not
reasonable. Indeed, such a construction would lead to strange results. For example,
suppose that Prime has two agents, one who comes to the brokerage with extensive real
estate experience, and one who comes to the brokerage with no experience whatsoever.
As applied to the experienced agent, paragraph eighteen would not be a "covenant not
to compete," because the agent's general knowledge about the real estate business
would not have been gained from Prime. Therefore, paragraph eighteen would be
enforceable as to that agent. As applied to the inexperienced agent, however, paragraph eighteen would be a covenant not to compete and would therefore be unenforceable. In other words, the language is exactly the same in both scenarios, and the
persons in both scenarios are doing exactly the same job in exactly the same industry,
but the scenarios lead to completely opposite results.4

4

This result is made even more questionable when one considers that paragraph
eighteen is supposedly unambiguous, so that the question of enforceability must be
decided as a matter of law, without consideration of extrinsic evidence.
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At any rate, even if the trial court's interpretation of paragraph eighteen is
reasonable, it is not the only reasonable interpretation. Prime's interpretation of paragraph eighteen, that it does not prevent all competition, is certainly reasonable as well.
That is, one can reasonably conclude that the use of the terms "materials" and "files" in
paragraph eighteen implies an intent to prohibit only the use of specific information
developed by or for Prime, not the use of the general knowledge and expertise Mitchell
gained through his employment.
Utah courts have long held that a contract provision will be construed, wherever
possible, in such a manner as to render that provision enforceable. A "cardinal rule" in
contract interpretation is to give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in
their agreements. Coulter & Smith. Ltd. v. Russell. 966 P.2d 852, 857-58 (Utah
1998). Courts should be reluctant to nullify those agreements, except in the clearest
situations. Thus, in Coulter & Smith, the Utah Supreme Court saved an option contract
from invalidation by the rule against perpetuities by implying a "reasonable time"
limitation on the exercise of the option. The court noted that "[t]he choice of contract
interpretations which avoid invalidating an agreement is favored under Utah law." IcL
at 858. See also Stangl v. Todd. 554 P.2d 1316, 1319-20 (Utah 1976) ("This court has
long adhered to the principle that in construing a contract, a construction giving an
instrument a legal effect to accomplish its purpose will be adopted where reasonable,
and between two possible constructions that will be adopted which establishes a valid
contract.").
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The trial court's grant of summary judgment depended entirely on its conclusion
that paragraph eighteen constituted a covenant not to compete. However, it is at least
reasonable to construe paragraph eighteen simply as an enforceable restriction on an
agent's ability to use Prime's proprietary information. Therefore, there is at least a
triable issue of fact as to the actual intended meaning of paragraph eighteen, and
summary judgment was not appropriate.
C.

Even if time and geographical limitations were required, reasonable
restrictions should be read into paragraph eighteen to give effect to the
agreement of the parties.
As the Alaska Supreme Court explained in Metcalfe, because paragraph eighteen

of Mitchell's agreement with Prime is not a covenant not to compete, but rather a
restriction on use of specific trade information, it is effective and enforceable even
without a geographical or time limitation. 919 P.2d at 1361-62. Therefore, the trial
court erred in holding paragraph eighteen unenforceable. However, even if paragraph
eighteen could only reasonably be considered as a covenant not to compete, requiring
time and geographical limitations, such limitations should be implied into paragraph
eighteen.
Courts in most jurisdictions have held that unless a covenant not to compete was
drafted in bad faith, an overbroad covenant should be reasonably altered to render it
enforceable. Data Management. Inc. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62, 64 (Alaska 1988). The
Restatement of Contracts also recommends this approach.
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Restatement (2d) of

Contracts § 184(2) (1981); see also id^ cmt. b. This approach appears to be required
by Coulter & Smith as well. 966 P.2d at 857-58.5
Geographical restrictions can easily be read into paragraph eighteen. Indeed,
such limitations are essentially self-executing, as the restriction on using Prime's
materials clearly is relevant only in areas in which Prime does business. See, e.g..
System Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon. 669 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1983) ("In light of the
industry's inherent limitations and the nature of the defendant's particular employment,
it was not unreasonable for SCI to omit from the covenant a specific and explicit spacial
restriction. The covenant is impliedly limited to the area in which SCI had been and is
seeking its market.")
Similarly, a reasonable time restriction can be read into paragraph eighteen. Just
as the court in Coulter & Smith added an implied time limitation to save the contract in
that case from unenforceability, 966 P.2d at 858, so too should the courts in this case,
if such a restriction is deemed necessary. As Coulter & Smith explained, when a con-

5

See also JAK Productions. Inc. v. Wiza. 986 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1993)
(applying Indiana law); Moore Bus. Forms. Inc. v. Wilson. 953 F. Supp. 1056 (N.D.
Iowa 1996) (applying Iowa law); LaCalhene. Inc. v. Spolver. 938 F. Supp. 523 (W.D.
Wis. 1996) (applying Minnesota law); National Interstate Ins. Co. v. Perro. 934
F. Supp. 883 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (applying Ohio law); Nestle Food Co. v. Miller. 836
F. Supp. 69 (D.R.I. 1993) (applying Rhode Island law); Herring Gas Co.. Inc. v.
Magee. 813 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (applying Mississippi law); Kramer v.
Robec. Inc.. 824 F. Supp. 508 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (applying Pennsylvania law); Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components. Inc.. 789 F. Supp. 1201 (D.N.H.
1992) (applying New Hampshire law); Bunker Romano Corp. v. Altech. Inc.. 765
F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. 111. 1990) (applying Washington law); Data Management. Inc. v.
Greene. 757 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1988); Phoenix Orthopedic Surgeons. Ltd. v. Peairs. 790
P.2d 752 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); National Graphics Co. v. Dillev. 681 P.2d 546 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1984).
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tract is silent on the time within which an act is to be performed, courts will infer that
the act was required to be done within a reasonable time. Id In addition, where a
contract is silent as to a certain point, courts can also consider relevant industry
standards. Rg,, Craig Food Indus, v. Weihing. 746 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) ("Trade usage or custom is permissible to explain technical terms in contracts to
which particular meanings attach; to make certain that which is indefinite, ambiguous,
or obscure; to supply necessary matters on which the contract itself is silent\ and
generally to elucidate the intention of the parties when the meaning of the contract
cannot be clearly ascertained from the language.")

Before the trial court, Prime

submitted uncontroverted evidence establishing that the standard restriction in the real
estate brokerage business is one year. (Urry Dep., R. 849:24 - 855:20, Add. Ex. 3;
Martin Aff. 11 5-8, R. 877-78, Add. Ex. 6.)
D.

Mitchell clearly agreed not to use Prime's customer list and other
proprietary information for his own purposes, and he should be held to that
agreement.
The record before the trial court reveals three undisputable facts. First, Mitchell

expressly agreed not to use information and materials gained from Prime to his own
advantage. Second, Prime provided Mitchell with lists of potential clients and customers, which Prime itself had developed. Third, Mitchell did use information and
materials gained from Prime to his own advantage.

It is clearly permissible for a

broker to obtain relief in such a situation. The fact that Prime might have been precluded from obtaining relief in a different factual situation should not render paragraph
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eighteen unenforceable as applied to the case at bar. C£. Perry v. Moran. 748 P.2d
224, 230-31 (Wash. 1987), modified on other grounds 766 P.2d 1096 (Wash. 1989)
(noting that five-year term in noncontact provision may have been unreasonably long,
but issue was moot because employer was seeking to enforce provision only for
eighteen-month period after termination).
Prime is not looking to prevent Mitchell from earning a living. Prime is not
even trying to keep Mitchell from competing in the real estate industry. Instead, Prime
is simply being asked to be compensated for the damages Prime has sustained as a
result of Mitchell's misuse of customer information that Prime itself developed at
Prime's own time and expense. Mitchell expressly agreed to paragraph eighteen, and it
is only fair to ask Mitchell to live up to his agreement.

CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Prime Commercial, Inc., therefore respectfully requests
that this Court vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Prime's
counterclaims against Mitchell and remand the action to the trial court for further
proceedings. Prime further requests that this Court award Prime its costs incurred in
bringing this appeal pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
Telecopier: (801) 263-1010
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Deputy Cleric

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRENT D. MITCHELL,
Plaintiff,

ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., a
Corporation, and SALT LAKE
BOARD OF REALTORS, a
Corporation,

Civil No. 950906465 CV

JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA

Defendants.

On the 8th day of May, 1998, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
came on for hearing before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba. The Plaintiff appeared by
and through his attorney, Dennis K. Poole, and the Defendant Prime Commercial, Inc.
appeared by and through its attorney, Nathan Wilcox. The Court having considered
the affidavits and memoranda in support of and in opposition to such Motion for Partial
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Summary Judgment and having determined that there are no genuine issues of
material fact which are set forth as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Brent D. Mitchell ("Mitchell"), an individual, and the Defendant

Prime Commercial, Inc. ("Prime Commercial"), a corporation, entered into an
agreement dated January 1, 1994, designated by the parties as a broker-agent
agreement (the "Agreement"), whereby Mitchell agreed to act as an independent
licensed real estate agent for Prime Commercial, as broker.
2.

Paragraph 7 of the Agreement states:

The division and distribution of the earned commissions pursuant to
Paragraph 6 of this Agreement shall take place as soon as feasible after
collection of such commissions from the party or parties for whom the
services may have been performed. Any suit for the collection of
commissions from clients shall be maintained only in the name of Broker.
Agent shall not be entitled to any advance or payment from Broker upon
future commissions or commissions earned but uncollected. Agent's only
remuneration shall be Agent's share of the commissions paid by the party
or parties for whom services were performed. Any advances paid to
agents must be approved by Broker and must be documented by a note.
3.

Paragraph 11 of the Agreement states:

In accordance with law, Agent agrees that any and all listings of
property, and all employment in connection with the real estate business
shall be taken in the name of Broker. Listings shall be filed with Broker
within twenty four (24) hours after receipt of any such listing by Agent.
In consideration for the commission payable to Agent pursuant to the
terms of this Agreement, Agent agrees to and does hereby contribute all
right and title to any and all listings solicited and obtained by Agent to
Broker for the benefit and use of Broker, Agent and all other agents
associated with Broker to whom Broker may give the listing; provided,
however, that Agent shall have the rights provided in Paragraph 12 of
this Agreement with respect to listings procured by Agent prior to
termination.
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4.

Paragraph 18 of the Agreement states:

Agent shall not, after the termination of this Agreement, use to Agent's
own advantage, or to the advantage of any other person or corporation,
any information or materials gained for or from the files or business of
Broker.

5.

Paragraph 4 of the Agreement states:

Until termination of this Agreement, Agent agrees to work diligently and
use Agent's best efforts to sell, lease or rent any and all real estate listed
with broker, to solicit additional listings and customers for Broker and
otherwise promote the business of serving the public in real estate
transactions to the end that each of the parties to this Agreement may
derive the greatest profit possible, provided that nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to require Agent to handle or solicit
particular listings or authorize Broker to direct or require that Agent do
so. Agent agrees to perform no other activities in association with
Broker, except to solicit and obtain listings and sales, leases, representation agreements or management contract of property, for the parties'
mutual benefit, and to do so in accordance with law and the ethical and
professional standards as required in Paragraph 5 of this Agreement.
6.

After January 1, 1994, Mitchell became a member and manager of Red

Point Equity, LLC. ("Red Point"), a limited liability company engaged in the business
of real estate development.
7.

Mitchell became a member of Red Point which was organized to pursue

real estate development activities. The other member and manager of Red Point was
Mitchell's spouse.
8.

In 1994, Red Point entered into a joint venture agreement with Leonard

K.M. Fong ("Fong") for the development of a planned unit development on property
located on Atwood Boulevard in Murray, Utah.
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9.

In furtherance of the joint venture agreement and with the assistance of

East 5600 South; (ii) 2.5 acres at Alta; (iii) Alta Pines - 4070 South 900 East; (iv)
Landing Point - 176 North Redwood Rd; and (v) 2.2 acres - W. Jordan.
19.

Of the above five designated properties, only three of them were under

a current listing with Prime Commercial at the time Mitchell left. The 6-Plex property

consideration paid to Red Point (even if construed to be for the benefit of Mitchell) for
profits or an interest in a development joint venture with Fong.
|5.

Because the Agreement, specifically Paragraph 18, contains no facial

ambiguity, and because the use of any information or materials gained by Mitchell from
Prime Commercial would prohibit any competition by Mitchell, such restriction is
unenforceable as a matter of law.
p.

Because Paragraph 18 is not ambiguous and because the contract is an

integrated contract, the Defendant is not entitled to rely upon parol evidence, including

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing ORDER
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT in Case No. 950906465 CV was mailed, postage prepaid,
United States Mail, the rffi

day of May, 1998, to the following:

Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Douglas E. Grant, Esq.
Randall E. Grant, Esq.
GRANT & GRANT
349 South 200 East, Suite 410
Salt Lake City, ytah-84111
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THIS AGREEMENT, made this 1st day of January, 1994 by and between PRIME COMMERCIAL,
INC. ("Broker"), and Brent D. Mitchell ("Agent") an individual authorized to act as a licensed
real estate agent in the State of Utah.

WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, Broker is qualified to and does engage in business as a licensed general real
estate broker in the State of Utah; and
WHEREAS, Group maintains an office in the State of Utah, properly equipped with
furnishings and other equipment necessary and incidental to the proper operation of said
business, and staffed suitably to serve the public as a real estate broker; and
WHEREAS, Agent is now engaged in business as a licensed real estate agent; and
WHERE'XS, the parties consider it to be to their mutual advantage to form the association
hereinafter agreed to.
NOW, THEREFORE in consideration of the mutual covenants and conditions herein
contained, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1.

Broker agrees to make available to Agent, at Agent's request, all current listings in
the Broker's office. In addition, at Agent's discretion and at Agent's request, Broker
may, from time to time, supply Agent with prospective listings. Nothing herein stated
shall be construed to require Agent to accept or service any particular listing or
prospective listing offered by Broker; nor shall Broker have any right or authority
to direct that Agent see or service particular parties, or to restrict Agent's activities
to particular areas. Broker shall have no right, except to the extent required by law,
to direct or limit Agent's activities as to hours, leads, open houses, opportunity or
floor time, prospects, sales, sales meetings, schedule, services, inventory, time off,
training, vacations, or similar activities.

2-

At Agent's request and in Agent's sole discretion, Broker agrees to furnish such
advice, information and full cooperation as Agent shall decide. Broker agrees that by
furnishing any such advice, information or cooperation, Broker obtains no authority
or right to direct or control Agent's actions except as specifically required by law and
that Agent assumes and retains discretion for methods, techniques and procedures
used in soliciting and obtaining listings and sales, leases, or representation
agreements.
#
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Broker agrees that Agent may share with other agents all the facilities of the office
now operated by Broker in connection with the subject matter of this Agreement,
which office is now maintained at 4505 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 120, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84124.
Until termination of this Agreement, Agent agrees to work diligently and use Agent's
best efforts to sell, lease or rent any and all real estate listed with Broker, to solicit
additional listings and customers for Broker and otherwise promote the business of
serving the public in real estate transactions to the end that each of the parties to
this Agreement may derive the greatest profit possible, provided that nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to require Agent to handle or solicit particular listings
or authorize Broker to direct or require that Agent do so. Agent agrees to perform no
other activities in association with Broker, except to solicit and obtain listings and
sales, leases, representation agreements or management contract of property, for the
parties' mutual benefit, and to do so in accordance with law and the ethical and
professional standards as required in Paragraph 5 of this Agreement.
Agent agrees to commit no act of a type for which the Securities Commission or the
Board of Real Estate Examiners of the State of Utah is authorized to suspend or revoke
the license of either Agent or Broker. Broker and Agent agree to conform to and
abide by all laws, rules and regulations, and codes of ethics that are binding upon or
applicable to real estate brokers or agents.
Broker's typical and customary commissions from time to time in effect, shall be
charged to the parties for whom services are performed, except that Broker may
agree in writing to other rates with such parties. Broker will advise all agents
associated with Broker of any special commission rates made with respect to the
listings as provided in this paragraph. When Agent shall perform any services under
this Agreement for which a commission is earned, the commission shall, when
collected, be divided between Broker and Agent as set forth in the Commission
Schedule attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference, unless
Broker and Agent agree in writing upon a different method of dividing the
commission before completion of any particular transaction. In the event that two or
more agents participate in any service which is subject to this Agreement, or claim
to have done so, the amount of the commission over that accruing to Broker shall be
divided between the participating agents according to agreement between them or
by arbitration. In no case shall Broker be personally liable to Agent for Agent's
share of any commission not collected, nor shall Agent be personally liable to Broker
for any commissions not collected. In compliance with the laws of the State of Utah,
all commissions will be received by Broken When any commission shall have been
collected from the party or parties for whom the service was performed, Broker shall
hold the same in trust for Agent and Broker to be divided between them according to
the terms of this Agreement. Agents shall not have the right to negotiate
commissions with current or prospective clients without first discussing same with
Broker and obtaining permission from Broker.
The division and distribution of the earned commissions pursuant to Paragraph 6 of
this Agreement shall take place as soon as feasible after collection of such
commissions from the party or parties for whom the services may have b e e n
performed. Any suit for the collection of commissions from clients shall be
maintained only in the name of Broker. Agent shall not be entitled to any advance or
payment from Broker upon future commissions or commissions earned but
uncollected. Agent's only remuneration shall be Agent's share of the commissions
paid by the party or parties for whom services were performed. Any advances paid to
agents must be approved by Broker and must be documented by a note.
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8.

Broker shall not be liable to Agent for any expenses incurred by Agent, or for any of
Agent's acts except as specifically required by law, nor shall Agent be liable to
Broker for office help or expense. Agent shall have no authority to bind Broker by
any promise or representation unless specifically authorized in writing in a
particular transaction. Expenses that must, by reason of some necessity, be paid from
the commission, or are incurred in the collection of, or the attempt to collect, the
commission, shall be paid by the parties in the same proportion as the commission,
divided pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.

9.

Agent agrees to provide and pay for ail Agent's necessary professional licenses and
dues; Broker shall not be liable to reimburse Agent therefor. In the event that Broker
elects to advance sums to Agent for the payment of Agent's professional licenses,
dues or other items, Agent agrees to repay such advances to Broker upon demand and
Broker may deduct such advances from commissions otherwise payable to Agent.

10.

This Agreement does not constitute a hiring by either party. It is the parties'
intention that, so far as shall be in conformity with law, Agent shall be an
independent contractor and not Broker's employee, and in conformity therewith,
that Agent retain sole and absolute discretion and judgment in the manner a n d
means of carrying out Agent's selling and soliciting activities. Therefore, the parties
hereto are and shall remain independent contractors bound by the provisions of this
Agreement. Agent is under the control of Broker as to the result of Agent's work only
and not as to the means by which such is accomplished. This Agreement shall not be
construed as a partnership and Broker shall not be liable for any obligation incurred
by Agent.

11.

In accordance with law, Agent agrees that any and all listings of property, and all
employment in connection with the real estate business shall be taken in the name
of Broker. Listings shall be filed with Broker within twenty four (24) hours after
receipt of any such listing by Agent. In consideration for the commission payable to
Agent pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, Agent agrees to and does hereby
contribute all right and title to any and all listings solicited and obtained by Agent to
Broker for the benefit and use of Broker, Agent and all other agents associated with
Broker to whom Broker may give the listing; provided, however, that Agent shall
have the rights provided in Paragraph 12 of this Agreement with respect to listings
procured by Agent prior to termination.
On completion of any work-in-process, this Agreement may be terminated, with or
without cause, by Broker or Agent at any time. Broker may terminate this
Agreement on the occurrence of any of the following causes:
(a) An election of Broker to sell its entire business or to cease doing business;
(b) Any breach of this Agreement by Agent;
(c)

Suspension, revocation, or other termination of Agent's license;

(d) Failure of Agent to comply with any applicable law or regulation of
either the Securities Commission or the Board of Real Estate Examiners;
(e)

Conviction of Agent of any crime other than minor traffic offenses.

pon

, t e r niination of this Agreement, Agent's regular proportionate share of the
of m m ! s s i o n s o n a n y sales Agent has made that are not closed shall, upon the closing
such sales, be paid to Agent, if collected by Broker. Except in cases of termination
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for cause, Agent shall also be entitled to receive the portion of the commissions,
received by Broker after termination, allocable to the listing (but not the sale) as set
forth in Broker's current commissions schedules, on any listings procured by Agent
during Agent's association with Broker.
If, upon termination of this Agreement, Agent fails to complete work on any pending
transactions that normally would be rendered by Agent, Broker shall make
arrangements with another agent in Broker's organization to perform such work
and shall be compensated for completing the details of pending transactions and
such compensation shall be deducted from Agent's share of the commission.
In the event of disagreement or dispute between Agent and any other agent
associated with Broker, or between Broker and Agent arising out of or connected
with this Agreement which cannot be adjusted by and between the parties involved,
the dispute or disagreement shall be submitted to the Real Estate Board of which
Broker is a member for arbitration pursuant to the provisions of its bylaws, said
provisions being hereby incorporated by reference, and if the bylaws of such board
include no provision for arbitration, then arbitration shall be pursuant to the rules
of the American Arbitration Association which rules are by this reference
incorporated herein.
Agent agrees to indemnify Broker and hold Broker harmless from, as well as defend
Broker against, all claims, demands and liabilities, including costs and attorney's fees,
to which Broker is subjected by reason of any action taken by Agent or failed to be
taken by Agent pursuant to this Agreement.
It is contemplated by both parties to this Agreement that Agent will use a motor
vehicle for the purpose of transporting clients or other persons as part of Agent's
efforts to solicit and obtain listings and sales, rentals or leases of property, Agent
agrees as part of Agent's commitment to serving the public as a licensed real estate
agent to maintain motor vehicle liability insurance with the following minimum
coverage's: S100,000/S300,000/S5,000 bodily injury/property damage (or a combined
single limit of S300,000). Broker shall be named as an additional insured under
Agent's insurance coverages. Agent shall provide proof that such coverages are in
force at the time of execution of this Agreement and shall provide such proof at any
subsequent time at Broker's request.
Agent shall not, after the termination of this Agreement, use to Agent's own
advantage, or to the advantage of any other person or corporation, any information
or materials gained for or from the files or business of Broker.
The following provisions are also integral parts of this Agreement:
(a) This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the
successors, assigns, personal representatives, heirs and legatees of the
respective parties hereto, and any entities resulting from the
reorganization, consolidation or merger of any party hereto.
(b) This Agreement constitutes the entire understanding and agreement
between the parties and supersedes all prior agreements, representations
or understandings between the parties relating to the subject matter
hereof. All prior agreements relating to the subject matter hereof,
whether written or oral, are hereby merged into this Agreement.
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of this Agreement.
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This Agreement may not be modified except by an instrument in writing

(f)

signed by the parties hereto.
This Agreement shall be interpreted, construed and enforced according to

(g)

the laws of the State of Utah.

In the event any action or proceeding is brought by either party against
the other under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to
recover attorneys 1 fees in such amount as the court may adjudge
reasonable.
Agent stipulates that Agent has had the opportunity to review with Broker the
policies and procedures of Broker and understands the same.

(W

20.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement on the date first set
forth above.
BROKER:
PRIME COMM

AGENT

-£^

ACKNOWT FDGHfNT HP RECEIPT
«f rhe foregoing Agreement together with Exhibit A
I hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of the foregoing g

theret0

-

J

^7

^ / / <//?</

J^S
Agent

Date
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COMMISSION SCHEDULE

renditions Governing Payment of Commissions to Agent:

1.

Broker will only pay commissions on cash income.

2.

If Broker's share of a commission or any part thereof is deferred or if a note is taken,
Broker will not be required to pay any commission to Agent until cash income is
received.

3.

If a note is taken by Broker for commissions owed and interest is earned on that note,
then Agent shall receive a share of the interest proceeds in the same proportions as
the commission splits set forth in Exhibit A.

4

The commission schedule shall be based on Exhibit A as attached hereto. Said
schedule shall remain in effect, unless agreed upon by both parties in writing.

ft A A C ^ O

COMMISSION a r u i *>

PARTNER ASSOCIATE
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60-40
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$55,000.00
WO-000-00

$55 000.00

$27,500.00

$27,500.00

$90 000 00
»"J'™
$2S0 000 00
'
-

$21,000.00
$112.000.00

$14,000.00
$48,000.00
$89,500.00
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRENT D. MITCHELL,
PLAINTIFF,
CASE NO. 950906465 CV

VS.
PRIME COMMERCIAL INC., A
CORPORATION, AND SALT LAKE BOARD
OF REALTORS, A CORPORATION.
DEFENDANTS.

DEPOSITION OF STEVE ORRY

TAKEN! MAY 22. 1996

INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS
5980 South Fashion Blvd.
Murray, Utah 84107
263-1396
File No. 52296
Reported oy:
__
KELLY SOMMERVILLB, CSR, RPR
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A.

Some less independent than others.

Q.

In your understanding of that term,

independent contractor, what makes them independent
contractors?
A.
agent.

It's a definition of a real estate
They're, well, again, you're asking a very

difficult question because based on my answer it can
go either direction you want to take it.

What

should be an independent agent is that that agent
comes to the office and you supply them with a desk
and a phone and as necessary means to conduct their
business activity.

And one thing with our agents at

Prime Commercial, they are all much less independent
than others simply because we provide more.

That

means if someone needs a draw on funds, someone
needs help financially, Prime Commercial has always
been there to be there for them.

So by definition,

we probably don't have an independent agent in our
company because every one of them have become
dependent upon Prime Commercial from time to time
for help, which is unique in dealing with a real
estate brokerage company like Prime Commercial or
others that I've ever been involved in.
So the term independent agent should be
that they're there, they pay for their own phones,
24
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1 I between Prime Commercial and Mr. Mitchell that you
2
3

currently are aware of, written agreements?
A.

Not that I'm aware of, no.

That doesn't

4

mean there aren't any, but that doesn't mean -- we

5

have plenty of things to do.

6

these things straight five, six years down the road.

7

Q . I

It's hard to keep

presume that prior to the time that

8

this was entered into, Mr. Mitchell was a licensed

9

real estate agent in the state of Utah; is that

10 I correct?
11

A.

I'd make that same assumption.

12

Q.

You wouldn't have hired him or entered

13

into this agreement if that would have been false;

14

is that correct?

15

A.

That's correct.

16

Q.

What training did Prime Commercial

17

provide to Mr. Mitchell upon his being retained as

18

an agent for Prime?

19

A.

I personally worked with Brent basically

20

from the day he started until the day he left or was

21

asked to leave is a better way to put it.

22

no previous experience in real estate and so I

23

provided him with lists of potential candidates,

24

potential sellers of income property, both himself

25

and Greg Pavich actually are the two guys that were

Brent had

32
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there at the time.

I provided him lists that I had

created over several years of apartment property
owners that he could use for cold calling.
him how to write an earnest money offer.
him how to write a contract.

I taught
I taught

I basically explained

to him all the pro forma procedures, explained to
him the investment analysis of income property,
specifically apartments was where he chose to spend
his time.

I helped him in the process of him

talking to clients about developing projects that I
went through and developed, and showed him how to do
the development pro formas and actually did
development pro formas for him and his accounts.
Basically I have to say, everything
Brent Mitchell learned about real estate he learned
at Prime and the people he was associated with at
Prime.

Prior to that date, he was installing

sprinkler pipe.
Q.

Under the terms of your agreement with

Mr. Mitchell under Exhibit Number 1, the broker
agreed to assist the agent at its direction, did it
not?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Is it also true that as the agent

succeeds so does the brokerage company?
33
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1

Q.

2

Why don't you identify that specific

conversation for me?

3

A.

The conversation would relate

4 J specifically to the Red Points Fong scenario and I
5

had worked with Brent and two or three other, and I

6

can't remember the names quite frankly, past

7

projects where he wanted me to come in and help him

8

with a development pro forma for the potential of

9

building condominiums and duplexes and things of

10

that nature.

11

Q.

We'll come back to that point here.

12

Under the terms of Exhibit Number 1, what did you

13

understand Mr. Mitchell was to perform in terms of

14

services for Prime?

15

A.

Well, if you go to paragraph 11, I think

16

it pretty well clearly defines it.

17

accordance with the law, agents agree any and all

18

listings of the property and all employment, all

19

employment in connection with the real estate

20

business shall be taken in the name of the broker."

21

That means basically anything you do in the real

22

estate business belongs to the broker and is subject

23

to the broker's fee schedule.

24

Q.

It says, "In

so define to me what other types of

25 I employment would, be included within that phrase

I

3
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1

according to your

understanding?

2

A.

All employment.

3

Q.

That includes development

4

A.

Absolutely.

5

Q.

Would that include his acquisition

6 J piece of
7
8

activities?

property?

A.

If he were using Prime Commercial

using commissions to buy the property,
Q.

Even if it were his own

10

A.

If he were to take a commission,

commissions?

LI

give you an example of that.

L2

to me and said,

L3

property.

.4

commissions, even Prime's share of the

.5

into buying this property."

.6

fine.

8 I

and

absolutely.

9

7

of a

I'll

One of the agents

"I don't have the money to buy

came
this

I want to be able to put all the
commission

And I said,

"That's

You can buy it and you own 70 percent of it.

Your split is 70 percent.
Q.

Prime owns 30 percent."

What if the agent wanted to put in his

9 I 30 percent?
0

A.

If he wanted to put in his 30 percent,

1

that's fine.

He can buy it on his own.

He has to

2

notify the brokerage company he's buying

3

it's part of the requirement of the contract

it because

4 I notify any seller that a buyer is a licensed
5

to
agent

and the broker should be notified if he is buying

37
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1
2

real estate.
Q.

If an agent wanted to go out and build a

3

piece of property and he didn't use any of Prime's

4

funds, commissions, would that still be included

5

within the language of paragraph 11?

6

A.

If he is not taking services.

If he is

7

providing services for equity, the answer is that

8

Prime would own a portion of those services.

9
10
11

Q.

So the distinguishing characteristic is

whether or not he is providing services?
A.

If he's providing services and not being

12

compensated for those services and he is receiving

13

equity in lieu of those services, then the services

14

that he is performing is on behalf of Prime

15

Commercial and Prime Commercial will be compensated

16

for them.

17

in our company and with every other agent I've been

18

associated with and every other brokerage company

19

I've been associated with.

20

agents that in the past in this business have tried

21

to provide those services without commission or

22

reduction in commission and then therefore getting

23

an interest in the property and the brokerage

24

community has not stood for that and that is

And that's true with every agent we have

There are a lot of

25 I something that has happened here and we aren't
38
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2

standing for it either.
Q.

Look at paragraph 4.

As I read that

3

particular paragraph, the agent's responsibilities

4

are to sell, lease, rent, solicit listings and

5

customers.

6

paragraph?

7 I

A.

8

correct.

9

Q.

Is that a fair summary of that

Sure.

Of £hat paragraph, you're

And as I also read that paragraph, it

10

says that the agent agrees to perform no other

11

activities in association with the broker; is that

12

correct?

13

A.

That's correct.

14

Q.

Does that mean that Mr. Mitchell or,

15

well, let's leave it to any agent, an agent is

16

precluded from doing developing activities from the

17

broker?

13

A.

Understand that development

activity

L9

active in the process of trying to sell the

JO

or lease the property.

51

property, you're in the act of trying to sell or

•2

lease that property, it's just a part of that

3 J activity.

is

property

If you're developing a

If I go develop a shopping center, I'm in

4

a situation where I'm building that project, in the

5

process of leasing it, and selling it.

It's a part
39
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1

of that transaction.

2

I'm in the process of selling it.
Q.

3

It's a part of that activity.
I'm to sell.

But they are separate and distinct

4 J activities, are they not?
5
6

MR. KARRENBERG:

misstates the witness's testimony.

7 J sale.
8

I'll object.

It was not separate.

It

It's part of the

He said it was included

in it .

9 J

Q.

(By Mr. Poole)

Is the selling separate

10 J and distinct from the development though?
11

A.

No, it's part of the process.

12

Q.

Every developer intends at some point to

13

sell, does he not?

14
15

A.

Or lease.

Q.

Okay.

That's what you're doing it

for.

16

And if I were developing a piece

17

of property and I hired you to sell, our activities

18

would be separate and distinct, would they not?

19

That's a yes or no.

20
21

MR. KARRENBERG:

If you can answer yes

or no.

22

THE WITNESS:

23

question.

24

respond to it.

25

Q.

I don't understand the

I don't understand the question.

(By Mr. Poole)

I can't

If I decide to develop
40
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Q.

And Prime would be entitled to that if

the services provided were development services as
opposed to the listing, the selling, or the leasing
of the property?
MR. KARRENBERG:
foundation.

I'll object as to

It misstates the witness's testimony.

He already told you several times, Dennis, that
development services are part of the sales leasing
and you're still trying to distinguish it.
that's not the witness's testimony.

And

You can answer

the question.
THE WITNESS:

The answer to the

question, as my counsel just stated, I'm telling you
that is part of section 11, paragraph 11.

All

employment in connection with real estate business,
and if you want to go to that paragraph, that
clearly is the answer to the question.

If you want

to go to paragraph 4, I've already clearly stated t
you that the sale, lease or rent, if there's
development activity is part of the sale or lease o
that property.

It's part of that transaction, part

of that obligation, and part of the responsibility
of the agent to provide that income to Prime
Commercial.

I can give you a very good example of

that, if you'd like to hear one.
44
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Q.

(By Mr. Poole)

going to hear one-

Well, I'm sure we're

Have other agents left Prime in

the last two years, let's say '93, '94?
A.

I believe, let's see, there's one agent

that was there for a very short time that came and
left.
Q.

Have you had any other lawsuits

involving agents in the last five years?
A.

Never had a lawsuit with regard to an

Q.

Have you arbitrated any disputes between

agent.

agents and Prime in the last five years?

1994.

A.

Never had an argument with an agent.

Q.

Now, Mr. Mitchell departed from Prime in

Do you recall the approximate date that that

occurred?
A.

You'd have to remind me, I don't.

Q.

Mr. Mitchell says about August 31 of

1994, would you disagree with that date?
A.

In that time frame.

Q.

What was your understanding of the

reasons that he departed?
A.

Number one, he didn't depart.

terminated and asked to leave the building'.

He was
He was

escorted from the building.
4!
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1

to the Fong deal?

2 1

A.

Absolutely.

3

Q.

What was that payment to be?

4

A.

Well, it would have been 50 percent of

5

anything he received.

He agreed to that that day

6

just like he had agreed to it previously.

7

Q.

And when did he agree to it previously?

8

A.

Oh, probably four to six months prior to

9

that, just prior to his marriage.

His wife first

10 J became aware of this Red Points Equities.
11 J on his desk.

I saw it

One of the secretaries had mentioned

12

to me that he had been having Prime do an awful lot

13

of work with something regarding Red Point Equities

14

on Prime letterhead and she was a little concerned

15

about it and was asking if that was appropriate.

16

So, when I approached Brent on it, we

17

discussed it for an hour or so and he agreed to that

18

for a lot of reasons, we'd discussed how much money

19

Prime Commercial had committed to him over the years

20 I and the kinds of commitment we had and obviously
21
22
23
24
25

it's the right thing to do and he agreed to it.
Q.

Was the agreement to split commissions

or profits or both?
A.

Both, absolutely both, and it wasn't

until the day he was terminated that he told me he
53
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had determined he was not going to do that.
Q.

Now, when you became aware of this Red

Points, you said this was prior to his marriage?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

And do you know if Red Points was

created prior to the marriage?
A.

I don't know.

I couldn't tell you.

All

I know is I saw a document or a partnership
agreement he was working on and I pointed it out to
him and does he think that was right, and we
discussed it for some time.

Then he, at that point

in time, he agreed that what he was doing was wrong
and that Prime Commercial should be involved in it.
And again, up until the day he was terminated, that
was my understanding as well as the understanding of
the balance of the agents.
Q.

If Prime was to be involved in it, why

wasn't Prime a party to a development agreement with
Mr. Fong?
A.

Very simply, Brent Mitchell had no

intention at the time he created that agreement to
have Prime Commercial be a part of that.

And that's

why we had our conversation.
Q.

And that's your conclusion.

Did Mr.

Mitchell, other than when he was terminated, tell
54
Kelly Sommerville, R.P.R.

0008<

you that he was not going to have Prime involved?
A.
question.
Q.

I'm sorry, I didn't understand the
At what time are you talking about?
Other than the time when Mr. Mitchell

was terminated and he said he wasn't going to pay
anything to Prime, did he tell you at any other
point in time that Prime was not going to be
involved in the Fong transaction?
A.

From the first day I've talked to him,

okay, when I saw the agreement on his desk, it was
just prior to his marriage, and I discussed it with
him.

And he at that point in time had had no

intention to have Prime involved.
Q.

He told you that?

A.

That's correct.

agreement.

It was in the

We weren't in the agreement and I asked

him why, and so we discussed it.

And after our

discussion was over, it ended very friendly, very
amiably.

He says, "You're right, I'm wrong.

Prime

Commercial should be involved and you will be
involved."

Until the day when I pointedly asked

him, "What's going on with Fong?
leave, aren't you?"

You're going to

I asked him, "You're going to

leave before this Fong deal ever goes, aren't you?"
And he said, "Yes, I am."

And I said, "Why is that,
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because you don't have any intention of paying Prime
Commercial, do you?"
said, "Why?"
that day."
you?

He said, "No, I don't."

I

He said, "You pressured me into that
I said, "What do you mean I pressured

We had a conversation and you agreed it was

the right thing to do, and you've changed your
mind."

And I said, "Why?"

And he said, "Because my

wife told me it wasn't right."
The two times we came to the agreement,
once was with Red Point Equities and the second was
when I terminated him, the second day.

And we came

to a full agreement and both times in his
conversation with his wife, his wife told him not to
do something.

So he went with her decision.

He

gave me an answer yes one day and no the next day.
He did the same thing with Red Point Equities.
Q.

You said you saw an agreement and I kind

of made an assumption of what it was.

What was it

you said?
A.

I said his partnership agreement he was

negotiating with Red Point.
Q.

Did you understand Red Point to be a

partnership?
A.

Red Point Equities, as far as I'm

concerned, is an L.L.C., as far as I'm aware of
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trying to find out.
Q.

Well, tell me today what information

you're aware of that was used?
A.

Anything he took with him that in terms

of the accounts, the clients, example, the
gentleman, Larry Stewart who was introduced to him
and he was a co-listing with myself.

He was using

Larry Stewart as a client to pursue our real estate
and try to close transactions that were in progress
with Prime, Inc.
Q.

So his knowledge of Larry Stewart?

A.

And transactions that were in process,

the duplexes he was trying to sell for Larry at the
time he was with Prime.
Q.

I thought those were sold,

Stewart-Farnsworth and Stewart-Brenkenridge?
A.

There were others he was working on.

Q.

So by simply knowing the identity of Mr

Stewart?
A.

No, and the property.

Q.

And the property.

Those then became

information from the files or business?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Is it your company's position that if

Mr. Mitchell develops any names or leads or
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1

information while an agent for Prime, that is

2

Prime's information to be left to Prime?

3 I

A.

It is something in my experience in

4 I working with and working for other brokerage
5

companies, that the information received and the

6

clients that are developed during the time you're

7

with a brokerage company is something that is

8

discussed and negotiated as part of the final

9

settlement agreement and separation agreement.

10

And

in every circumstance that I've been involved in and

11 I other agents that have worked for Prime Commercial
12

who have come from other brokerage companies, that

13

information has been deemed of value to that broker

14

and they have been compensated for a period of time

15

for that information and for those clients and for

16

those relationships.

17

Q.

18

So, you're telling me that Prime, in the

past", when it has acquired or entered into a

19 J relationship with a new agent, has compensated past
20

brokers for information?

21

A.

Substantially.

22

Q.

Would that compensation be in the form

23 J of commissions on transactions closed?
24

•

A.

Commissions on transactions that closed

25 I inwards as to a year or year and a half after they
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1
2

leave that brokerage company.
Q.

Would they be contracts that were under

3 I contract?
4

A.

Deals in process, relationships,

5

period.

6

us to Prime from Consolidated Realty had a

7

relationship with Pets Mart, had a relationship with

8

two or three other retailers, and every transaction

9

that has been consummated by Prime Commercial, we

10

Example of an agent that came to work for

have paid Consolidated Realty Group a portion of

11 I that commission.
12
13

Same thing happened with an agent

from Coldwell Banker.
Q.

Is that your understanding then that

14

that is a function of trade agreement or trade

15

practice I guess is the word?

16

MR. KARRENBERG:

Insofar as you ask for

17

a legal conclusion, I'll object.

18

question.

19
20
21
22
23

THE WITNESS:
to the contract.
Q.

Okay.

You can answer the

It's in reference

It's also in reference --

(By Mr. Poole)

You just referred to

Exhibit 1?
A.

It's Number 1, 11, all listings of

24 I property, and all employment in connection with the
25

real estate, and also when you get into discussions
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1

about all the activity, the information, etc. that

2

they procure at Prime belongs to Prime as part of

3

industry practice.

4

agent leaves, a certain percentage of his income is

5

paid to the other broker for a period of time

6

because these transactions and these relationships

What happens is that when an

7 J take a long time to develop.

And during that time

8 I period, that agent is using the overhead, the
9
10

offices, the income, the expense of that operation
to procure those relationships.

And the time,

11 I there's so much time spent in developing them that
12

very often the income comes just prior to, it very

13

commonly seems to come just prior to when this agent

14

finds a way to leave.

15

So, as part of that practice, commercial

16

real estate brokerage companies throughout the

17

country that I've been involved with court with each

18

other in making sure that those separations are

19

amiable amongst everyone, so if it happens to them,

20

it happens to us.

21
22

Q.

Everyone's fair.

You've mentioned here that you're

concerned about Mr. Mitchell working with Larry

23 I Stewart on duplexes that closed after he had left
24
25

Prime?
A.

Uh-huh.
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Q-

At the time that Mr. Mitchell left

Prime, as to those other duplexes, did Mr. Stewart
have a listing with Prime?
A.

I believe one of the listings expired

after he sold it, but I couldn't tell you that
because I haven't been able to get all the
information to verify.
Q.

Let's assume for the moment that that

listing did expire.
A.

Okay.

Q.

By virtue then of the fact that Mr.

Mitchell may have contacted Mr. Stewart, obtained a
new listing, that would justify Prime in claiming a
commission.

Is that your position?

A.

That's my position.

Q.

Where in this agreement Exhibit Number 1

does it allow for that?
A.

I couldn't tell you specifically in

terms of the -- I can't answer the question.

I

suppose I don't know.
Q.

Do you want to take a minute and look at

the agreement so you can refresh your memory?
A.

Under section 18 where "Agent shall not,

after the termination of this Agreement, use to
Agent's own advantage, or to the advantage of any
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1 J other person or corporation, any information or
2

materials gained for or from the files of the

3

business of Broker."

4

information,

5 J

Q.

And that would include people,

Is it your position that if Mr. Stewart

6 J contacted Mr. Mitchell today and said, "Mr.
7

Mitchell, I want you and your current broker to list

8 I a property for me."
9
10 J
11

Would you claim entitlement to

that transaction if it were closed?
A.
correct.

By the letter of this agreement, that's
And what I'm trying to tell you, this is

12 J why you're not listening obviously, because you keep
13 I coming back to the same question.

There's a

14

practice in brokerage companies.

The reason that's

15

in here is we don't want people to come in and work

16

for a company and have us expend the cost and energy

17

and time to pay for an agent to procure a client and

18

leave and collect a commission thereafter at a

19 I better brokerage house with a higher commission in
20

order to take an unfair advantage of that brokerage

21

company.

22

And as a part of that, all the other

23 J reputable brokerage companies, the brokerage
24

companies that actually operate a full service

25 j brokerage company and pay a lot of money to do that,
78
Kelly Sommerville, R.P.R.

000854

have separation agreements.

And there is a time

period where you wind that down so that at one point
in time, correct, given this situation, if Larry
Stewart closed on a duplex three months after, six
months after, yeah, Larry Stewart's commission
should have come to Prime and Brent Mitchell would
have received his share based on his split with
Prime at the time.

It would have been in the

separation agreement.
Now Pro Active, his now current
brokerage company, would not have received a share.
And after a period of time that goes to zero.

It's

a settling out period to let the time go from when
the cost has been incurred by the brokerage company
to procure the transaction and then after that time
period has expired, and really the brokerage company
now is acting as a broker for that particular agent,
is spending the money to procure the sales and the
commissions.

So it's just a given way of doing

business.
Q.

Does Exhibit 1 require Mitchell and

Prime to sit down at termination and negotiate his
settlement agreement?
A.

Well, if he doesn't, it goes right back

to it, then he's not allowed to use any of it, if he
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1

Q.

(By Mr. Poole)

You've indicated that

2 I Mr. Mitchell has used information from the files for
3 I business consisting of accounts, clients, you
4 J mentioned the name of Larry Stewart and specific
5

properties, anything else that you believe or you

6

contend that Mr. Mitchell gained from the files of

7 I business for the broker?
8 J

A.

Bottom line is that Mr. Mitchell had no

9 J real estate experience, had no clients, he has my
10

list, he's probably been continuing to use my list

11 I of apartment, perspective apartment sellers.

I have

12

a computer generated list that I paid someone to put

13

together several years ago.

14

has that.

15

using in real estate, the day he left, unless it was

16

new information, was information he gained from

17

being at Prime Commercial.

I'm assuming he still

More importantly, any information he's

18

Q.

How do you segregate what he can use and

19

what he can't?

20

A.

That's why you have a separation

21

agreement, Dennis.

22

and do that so there aren't problems like that.

23

Q.

That's exactly why you sit down

is it your position that just the

24

knowledge of the business in terms of filling out an

25

earnest money, for example, is that something he
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1

can't do later on?

2 1

A.

Obviously not.

3

Q.

In terms of techniques used in cold

4
5

calling, is that something he can't do later on?
A.

No.

I'm telling you, I'm going to

6 J repeat it again.

The answer to your question is,

7

everything that would be determined as to what he

8

can use would be defined in a separation agreement

9

which we attempted to accomplish.

And if he didn't,

10 J then I don't have an answer to your question because
11

I don't know.

It's something that's negotiated,

12 I Dennis.
13
14

Q.

So it's not in your agreement, so it had

to be negotiated at a later date?

15

MR. KARRENBERG:

I'll object.

Lack of

16

foundation, not in the agreement, in the paragraph,

17

he's already referred to it in paragraph 18.

18 J

MR. POOLE:

I'm asking him to tell me

19

what other materials and files and information were

20

obtained and you're telling me you don't know.

21

MR. KARRENBERG:

Excuse me.

He already

22

told you what he did know.

He also told you he's

23

waiting to get the information we moved to compel on

24 J in discovery.
25

Q.

(By Mr. Poole)

Is there anything else
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DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone:
(801) 263-3344
Fax:
(801) 263-1010
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
BRENT D. MITCHELL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., a
Corporation, and SALT LAKE
BOARD OF REALTORS, A Corporation,
Defendants.

:

AFFIDAVIT OF
BRENT D. MITCHELL

:

CIVIL NO. 950906465 CV

:

JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA

:
:

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
BRENT D. MITCHELL, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

Apart from my employment as a real estate agent, I am

also a member and manager of Red Point Equity, L.L.C.

("Red

Point"), a limited liability company engaged in the business of
real estate development.
2.

I became a member of Red Point which was organized to

pursue real estate development activities independent of any AgentBroker relationship existing between me and Prime Commercial.

MITCH2.AFF (AN)

AAA

3.

In 1994, Red Point entered into a joint venture agreement

with Leonard K. M. Fong ("Fong") for the development of a planned
unit development on property located on Atwood Boulevard in Murray,
Utah.
4.

With my assistance, and in furtherance of the joint

venture agreement, Fong acquired the real property

located on

Atwood Boulevard from unrelated third parties resulting in the
payment of real estate commissions to Prime Commercial.
5.

As the developer of the project on Atwood and pursuant to

the terms of the joint venture agreement between Red Point and
Fong, Red Point was to retain a share of the profits from the
venture.

The profits Red Point was to retain were for Red Point's

development activities, and not any activities associated with
Paragraph 4 of the Agreement between me and Prime Commercial.
6.

Fong and I agreed that once the planned unit development

was completed I, as an agent of Prime Commercial, would market and
sell the individual units pursuant to a listing agreement the joint
venture would enter into with Prime Commercial.
7.

Fong subsequently refused to finance construction of the

planned unit development, thereby breaching

the joint venture

agreement between Fong and Red Point.
8.

As a consequence of Fong's breach, Red Point commenced an

action in Third District Court entitled Red Point Equities, L.C. v.
Leonard K.M. Fong, Civil No. 950903430CN.

With the filing of the

Complaint against Fong, Red Point recorded a lis pendens in the
offices of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
2

9.

In an attempt to resolve the breach of the joint venture

agreement and to settle the claims in the above-mentioned litigation, Fong purchased Red Point's interest in the joint venture for
approximately $15,000.00.

The settlement amount paid was solely

attributable to Red Point's interest in the joint venture. Neither
Prime Commercial nor I had a listing agreement to sell any joint
venture/partnership interest Red Point had in the joint venture
with Fong.

Consequently, no portion of the settlement was for any

commissions on the sale of the finished or unfinished units.
10.

At the time that Fong purchased Red Point's interest in

the joint venture agreement, the joint venture had not entered into
any listing agreements with Prime Commercial for the listing or
sale of any of

the finished units because no development or

construction had commenced.
11.
a

On or about the 30th of May, 1995, my attorney received

letter from counsel for Prime Commercial which listed five

properties

as known

listings which

Commercial prior to my leaving.

I had procured

for Prime

A copy of this letter is attached

hereto as Exhibit "A".
12.

Of the above five properties listed on the May 30th

letter from counsel for Prime Commercial, only three of them were
listed with Prime Commercial at the time I left.
property had been previously

The 6-Plex

sold for which Prime Commercial

received a commission; and there was no current listing with Prime
Commercial for that property at the time I terminated my association.

(Exhibit "A").

MITCH2.AFF (AN)

Also, I never had a listing agreement with

3

either Prime Commercial or any other broker for the 1.8 acres in
West Jordan.
13.

I had

no other

listings

at

the

time

I left

Prime

Commercial.
14.

I received no commissions from any of the three listings

I had at the time I left Prime Commercial.

Each of those listings

expired before a buyer was located.
15.

Of the three properties for which I had listing agree-

ments with Prime Commercial at the time I left Prime Commercial, I
have not listed any of those properties with any other broker, nor
have I collected commissions from any sales of such properties.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this

/ V

day of April, 1996.

BRENT D. MITCHELL
ACKNOWLEDGED before me by BRENT D. MITCHELL this / /

day of

April, 1996.
My Commission Expires:
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * *

BRENT D. MITCHELL,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 950906465CV
Judge Anne M. Stirba
Deposition of:

vs.
PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., a
corporation, and SALT LAKE
BOARD OF REALTORS, a
corporation,

BRSUT P, MITCHTO

Defendants.

Deposition of BRENT D. MITCHELL, taken at the
instance and request of Defendant Prime Commercial, Inc., at
the offices of Anderson & Karrenberg, 700 Bank One Tower, 50
W. Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, on Wednesday, October 16,
1996, at 9:55 a.m., before Vicky McDaniel, a Registered
Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State
of Utah, Utah License No. 87-108580.
* * .*

10 West Broadway, Suite 200 Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801) 322-3441 / FAX (801) 322-3443
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Q

Now, you did real estate deals for Mr. Stewart

who you referred to earlier while you were affiliated with
Prime Commercial?
A

I represented Larry.

I listed some properties

for him and represented him in the sale of those properties.
Q

And that's while you were affiliated with Prime

Commercial as an agent?
A

I don't understand.

Because of Larry Stewart?

Q

Yeah, while you were an agent affiliated with

Prime Commercial -A

Yes.

Q

-- you were listing properties for Mr. Stewart?

A

Yes.

Q

Did you close on any of those properties?

A

Yes.

Q

And you also did some real estate deals for

Mr. Furstenau while you were a real estate agent associated
with Prime Commercial?
A

Yes.

Q

You also did real estate deals for Mr. Reynolds

who you referred to while you were a real estate agent
associated with Prime Commercial; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Let's go back to --

A

Rob Reynolds and I had been friends for years.
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Q

-- Exhibit No. 2, if you would.

refers to certain properties listed.

On page 2 it

Were those all the

listings you had at the time you terminated your relationship
with Prime Commercial?
A

Yes.

Q

Were there any others?

A

No.

Q

Which ones were not listed?

A

I did not have a fee agreement on the sixplex.

Some of these weren't even listed.

There was no agency relationship there.

It's just, I knew

the owner and I knew he -- that at a certain price he would
be interested in selling.

And there was no listing agreement

there.
Q

The item listed No. 1 on page 2 of Exhibit 2 --

A

Right.

Q

-- correct?

A

Alta Pines, I had no listing agreement on Alta

Pines.

What other ones?

I just had a relationship with the owner and knew

that at a certain price he would sell and likely pay a
commission.

But never signed an agency relationship.

Q

And that's item No. 3 on Exhibit 2?

A

Right.

Landing Point, I had a fee agreement on

the 3-1/2 percent single party listing, and the 2.2 acres in
West Jordan I did not have a fee agreement on and I don't
believe I did.
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Q

How about No. 2, the 2.5 acres at Alta?

A

I had a fee agreement on that.

Q

Had you done any work in relation to the ones

that you say you didn't have a fee agreement on, No. 1,
No. -- what's the other one?
A

That I didn't have a -- at Alta Pines No. 3.

Q

Three, and you said maybe 5?
MR. POOLE:

You said 5, no fee agreement.

A

Yes, I actually -- the number one --

Q

Yes.

A

-- while I was at Prime Commercial had sold that

property to the then present owner for $186,000, and I knew
that.

So I had worked on it previously.

So I knew all about

the property because we purchased it.
Q

So there was stuff in the files at Prime

Commercial about that property?
A

Uh-huh.

Q

Okay.

A

No. 3, Alta Pines, I had gathered financial

No. 3?

information from the owner, income and expense information
and compiled it on a summary sheet so I could give it to
potential purchasers.
Q

So that was located in the files of Prime

Commercial?
A

Uh-huh.

104
Q

And who was the owner of Alta Pines at that

A

The three, all three in question were all owned

time?

by the same man.
Q

Who is that?

A

Cal Reynolds.

Q

Cal Reynolds is somebody that you had done deals

for while you were at Prime Commercial?
A

Yes.

Q

And who owned the other two properties?

A

Jack Gordon owned the two and a half acres in

Alta, and Scott Keller, and I can't remember his partner's
name, S and K Properties owned Landing Point apartments.
Q

Now, have you done any deals involving

Mr. Gordon or Mr. Keller or any organizations they're
associated with since you left Prime Commercial?
A

Mr. Gordon or Mr. Keller, no.

Q

Okay.

Did you close on or receive any

commissions or any remuneration at all in relation to the
property at Alta or Landing Point?
A

No.

Q

Do you know what happened?

Do those properties

still belong to those gentlemen?
A

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

To my knowledge, they still haven't sold.
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Q

Q

Now, No. 13 -MR. POOLE:

Back to Exhibit 8?

Exhibit 8.

This lists Larry Stewart-Royalfey-7

Heritage Home Care, Inc.
A

Uh-huh.

Q

And you were representing both parties or one

party in that transaction?
A

I was representing Larry Stewart.

Q

And Mr. Stewart was the buyer or the seller?

A

He was the buyer.

Q

And that's the same Mr. Stewart who you had done

real estate deals for while you were associated with Prime
Commercial?
A

It is.

Q

And what kind of property was this?

A

It was 2.75 acres of land in Sandy.

Q

Who was the real estate agent on the other side,

A

Mardel Topham.

Q

With what brokerage?

A

He's a broker.

It was raw

ground.

if any?

He's just Mardel.
Q

I don't believe he has a name.

He's an appraiser and a broker.

You indicate in these interrogatory answers you

have no recollection of when you were first contacted about
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this transaction or this property; is that correct?
A

Actually, you know, I know about when it was.

Q

When was it?

A

There was a property on Vine Street and about

5400 South there by the golf course that Larry and I had had
under contract with some people, and we were going to be
partners or Larry was going to be partners with these other
people, and we had become uncomfortable with those other
people.

When we'd gone under contract on that property, I

can't remember.

It was shortly after I left we became

uncomfortable with it and we decided not to buy that
property.

And there was an earnest money dispute in which we

let the earnest --it was even --it was actually arbitrated
by Steve Urry where we, rather than close on the property and
be partners with these people we weren't comfortable with, we
chose to walk away from our earnest money.
So after that had happened I went put to find
more property for Larry to buy.
to build twin homes on.

Larry wanted to buy property

So it was after I had left and

shortly after Urry and Stewart and I had arbitrated a
previous contract that I first showed him this property.

And

so to find the date, you talk to Urry, find out what date it
was we arbitrated, but I can't remember, but it was after I
had left.
Q

But the previous property, was that some deal
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you had started with when you were at Prime Commercial?

A

Yes.

Q

No- 14, you indicate that you can't recall the

name of the buyer on that property?

A

Oh, on 127 South Eighth East, yeah, I don't know

who it was.

Q

You don't have any records of that --

A

Well --

Q

-- to know who the buyer is?

A

Proactive property would have records on that,

but I don't keep it.

Q

Don't you have access to those records?

A

Yeah, if I really tried I could probably get

those records.

Q

I don't keep them.

I'd ask you to supplement that, the name of the

buyer from these records.

A
firm.

They were represented by another real estate

I guess it doesn't matter what I think relevant here,

does it?
MR. POOLE:

Q

Unfortunately , no.

Are you asking whether or not you're the one who

determines what's relevancy or the judge?

A

Well, I know the answer.

Doesn't matter if I

think I'm wasting time.

Q

You indicate in this interrogatory answer that
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A
okay.

I think he had five.

He did have two in --

Well, I think there's some duo listed.

There's an

error, because it's possible that 14 and 15 are the same one,
because 19 and - - 1 9 and 17 make more sense because he had
two condos in University Heights.
condos in one building.

I remembered he had two

I thought those two were -- but it's

not it.
Q

Assuming, then, that 14 and 15 really is just

one event -A

Yeah, I assume, I believe it is.

I'm pretty

sure he only had four condos.
Q

And No. 19 was one of the units that was part of

that exchange?
A

Yes.

Q

That involved No. 18?

A

Yes.

Q

Now, Mr. Davis, was he the purchaser?

A

Mr. David?

Q

Russell Davis, on No. 19.

A

I have no idea.

Q

You weren't representing Mr. Davis?

A

No, I didn't represent any of the buyers, nor

did I know them.
one.

We just got offers from agents.

Mac Brubaker bought one of the condos.

himself.

So that was one that I remember.

I did know

He represented
I don't remember
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Q

The one that closed in 1995.

A

Yes.

Rob's intention was to do a 1031 exchange

with the proceeds from that sale into another property, and
whether it was before or after the closing, but it was
sometime around there I was working for Rob to find him a
trade property for the proceeds from that sale, and exactly
when it was that I first talked to him about this property, I
don't know.

As a real estate -- I want to clarify this --as

a real estate agent you talk to dozens of people on a regular
basis about dozens of properties, and, you know, you get
flyers in your box or in the mail of all kinds of things that
are for sale.
Q

You never remember.
So this No. 23 was also done in connection with

the 1031 tax free exchange done in connection with the
Reynolds-Triple K transaction which closed on May 8th, 1995?
A

Yes.

Q

And those are all the transactions that you

did -- or, excuse me.

Let me restate that so we're accurate.

All of the transactions listed in that interrogatory are the
transactions you did between January 1st and August 31st,
January 1st, 1994 and August 31st, 1995?
A

Is August 31st, is that one year from when I

Q

I just show you, if you look at Exhibit No. 8

left?

and page 4, the answer even says that those are all listings
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Douglas E. Grant (#4328)
Randall E. Grant (#1235)
GRANT & GRANT
349 South 200 East, Suite 410
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-7777
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
Nathan B. Wilcox (#6685)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Defendant Prime Commercial, Inc.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRENT D. MITCHELL,
AFFIDAVIT OF
WILLIAM K. MARTIN

Plaintiff,

vs.
PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., a
corporation, and SALT LAKE BOARD OF
REALTORS, a corporation,

Civil No. 950906465CV
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

) ss:
County of Salt Lake

)

William K. Martin, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

0 0 0 8 7=

1.

I am the President of CRG Realty, a commercial real estate company in Salt Lake

City, Utah. I have been a real estate broker involved in the commercial real estate brokerage
business since 1976.
2.

I have reviewed the agreement of January 1, 1994, between Prime Commercial,

Inc. and Brent D. Mitchell ("Agreement"), as well as the deposition of Steven Urry taken May
22, 1996. In addition, I have reviewed the pleadings and discovery responses in this case.
Finally, I have reviewed the Affidavit of Brent D. Mitchell, wherein he states that he was a
member and manager of Red Point Equity, L.L.C. ("Red Point"), a company engaged in the
business of real estate development. Brent Mitchell ("Mitchell") claims that he organized Red
Point to engage in real estate activities separate from Prime Commercial, Inc. ("Prime").
3.

However, by entering into the Agreement dated January 1, 1994, with Prime,

Mitchell agreed that the only real estate business he would do would be to "solicit and obtain
listings and sales, lease, representation agreements or management contract of property. . . . "
(Agreement, 14.) Any real estate business Mitchell engaged in beyond soliciting and obtaining
listings and sales and lease representations, or management contracts, would be in violation of
paragraph 4 of his Agreement with Prime.

However, pursuant to paragraph 11 of the

Agreement, Mitchell also agreed that any and "all employment in connection with the real estate
business" would be taken in the name of Prime.
4.

Developing of property and providing services for the development of property

belonging to another is employment in connection with real estate business.

Accordingly,

Mitchell's employment in development of property should have been taken in the name of Prime.

2

Further, because the development of property is real estate business covered by Mitchell's
Agreement with Prime, Prime would be entitled to a percentage of the proceeds Mitchell earned
from the development and from his development services.
5.

In paragraph 18 of the Agreement with Prime, Mitchell agreed that he would not

use any information or materials from Prime for his own personal benefit after leaving Prime.
Provisions such as paragraph 18 are standard in agency contracts in the commercial real estate
industry.

According to paragraph 18, Mitchell was precluded from using information and

material gained from Prime for his own advantage. However, in the event that Mitchell did use
Prime's information or materials, Mitchell was obligated to compensate Prime according to the
compensation schedule set forth in the Agreement. Such an arrangement is consistent with the
standard in the commercial real estate industry.
6.

Because Mitchell was provided with extensive support, assistance, aid and training

by Prime, including providing Mitchell with the names of Prime's clients to contact, it is
expected that for a period of time after Mitchell left Prime, Mitchell would compensate Prime
for the benefit he obtained from transactions that were developed during the time he was with
Prime and developed at Prime's expense. Indeed, especially in the case of a new agent such as
Mitchell, where such extraordinary support and training was provided, including the
advancement of funds for an automobile, insurance, real estate licensing dues, and food, it is
a standard in the commercial real estate industry that a former broker will receive compensation
for a period of time for commissions generated by the agent after leaving the broker.

3
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7.

In the commercial real estate industry, it is the standard that an agent split with

his former broker the commissions he obtains on transactions that occur after his termination for
approximately one year.
8.

Accordingly, pursuant to paragraph 18 of his contract with Prime and the standard

in the commercial real estate industiy, Mitchell should have provided a portion of his
commissions earned for one year after he left Prime to Prime especially where Mitchell engaged
in real estate transactions with individuals or entities who were customers of Prime.
DATED:

May V , 1998.

——

William & Martin

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ( ^ d a y of May, 1998, by William

££ Martin.
My Commission Expires:
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as the superior court in its discretion considers advisable.6

METCALFE INVESTMENTS,
INC., Appellant,
v.
Linda S. GARRISON, David A. Garrison
and All Alaska Realestate Investments,
Inc., Appellees.
No. S-6772.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
June 28, 1996.

Real estate brokerage firm brought action against former employee, her husband,
and competitor company which former employee started. The Superior Court, John
Reese, J., entered summary judgment for
company and employee's husband on all
claims against them and for employee on her
wage claim, and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, Fabe, J., held that: (1) as a
matter of first impression, promise to refrain
from activity, such as using customer lists in
a new business, for unlimited period of time
is not subject to the statute of frauds, and (2)
oral noncompetition agreement of unlimited
duration did not violate the statute of frauds
and, thus, was enforceable.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Appeal and Error @=>934(1)
On review of grant of summary judgment, appellate court would review record in
light most favorable to nonmovant and draw
all reasonable inferences in its favor.
6.

Given our disposition of the issues in this appeal, it is unnecessary to address McGlothlin's
claims that the superior court erred in ordering

2. Appeal and Error <3=>893(1)
Appellate court reviews trial <*
grant of summary judgment de novo
judgment will be affirmed only if no g^ ^
issues of material fact exist and movants
entitled to judgment as a matter of I ^
3. Appeal and Error <s»863
When reviewing grant of summary j u d
ment, appellate court will consider any nj;
ter in the record that indicates existence
genuine issue of material fact
4. Master and Servant <3=>74, 79
Trial court has discretion to impose pen
alty pursuant to statute providing that, if
employer fails to pay wages due within three
days of termination, employer may be re*
quired to pay employee a penalty in the
amount of employee's regular wage; statute,
ry penalty is not automatic. AS 23.05.140((i)
5. Master and Servant <3=>74, 79
Statute providing that, if employer fails
to pay wages due within three days of termination, employer may be required to pay
employee a penalty in the amount of employee's regular wage from the time of demand
to the time of payment or for 90 working
days, whichever is the lesser amount, is not a
'treble damages" provision. AS 23.05.140(d).
6. Judgment <3=> 181(21)
Material issue of fact as to what the
parties agreed that employee's bonus would
be precluded summary judgment for employee on her claims for back wages and penalties under statute providing that, if employment is terminated, all wages become due
immediately and shall be paid within three
working days after termination and, if not,
employer may be required to pay employee a
penalty in the amount of employee's regular
wage. AS 23.05.140(b, d).
7. Contracts <s=>9(l)
Noncompetition agreement was not impermissibly vague; evidence indicated that
employee had agreed not to make use of real
estate brokerage firm's client list after departing and not to participate in sales to
that Taylor pay off the reimbursement award in
installments, and that the superior court erred in
denying her any award of attorney's fees.
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potential buyers who had first made contact
with firm during her employment and noncompetition agreement contained terms
which were sufficiently well defined.
8. Contracts <3=>ll7(9)
Lack of geographical limitation was irrelevant because restrictive covenant was not
blanket prohibition on competition, but rather selective restraint on doing business with
people who were potential customers of employer at time of employee's termination and
thus, the noncompetition agreement was not
rendered unenforceable by the lack of geographical or durational limitation.
9. Contracts <s>117(.5)
If a business is so large that restraint on
contacting former clients would amount to a
bar prohibiting employee from practicing her
specialty, court will require the restraint to
be narrowly drafted.
10. Contracts <^116(1)
Covenant not to contact former customers will be unreasonable if the former employee did not have access to confidential
information.
11. Frauds, Statute of ®=>46
In order for the statute of frauds to
apply, it must appear that the parties intended, when they made the contract, that it
should not be performed within the year.
AS 9.25.010.
12. Frauds, Statute of e=>50(2)
Promise to refrain from activity, such as
using customer lists in a new business, for
unlimited period of time is not subject to the
statute of frauds; rational is that, if promisor
were to die within one year, the promise not
to compete would be fully performed.
13. Frauds, Statute of <©=>50(2)
Oral noncompetition agreement of unlimited duration did not violate the statute of
frauds and, thus, was enforceable.
14. Contracts <3=>116(1)
Noncompetition agreement prohibiting
employee from expropriating information and
customers that real estate brokerage firm
had procured at its own expense did not

violate public policy so as to be unenforceable.
15. Judgment $»183
Employer's tort claims were not properly before trial court for summary adjudication since memorandum in support of former
employee's summary judgment motion never
mentioned or argued employer's tort claims
and tort claims were not addressed by either
party or the court at hearing on the motion
and thus, it was improper for trial court to
grant summary judgment on them. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 56.
Milford H. Knutson, Bledsoe & Knutson,
Anchorage, for Appellant
H. Frank Cahill, McNall & Associates,
P.C., Anchorage, for Appellee Linda S. Garrison.
Clifford J. Groh, Sr. and Todd J. Timmermans, Groh, Eggers & Price, Anchorage, for
Appellees David A. Garrison and All Alaska
Realestate Investments, Inc.
Before COMPTON, C.J., and
RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH
and FABE, JJ.
OPINION
FABE, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Metcalfe Investments appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of Linda Garrison, David Garrison, and
All Alaska Realestate. We conclude that
there are genuine issues of material fact that
require us to reverse the grant of summary
judgment.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
[1] The parties presented contradictory
versions of the events that culminated in this
lawsuit. Because Metcalfe Investments opposed summary judgment below, we must
review the record in the light most favorable
to Metcalfe Investments and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Wilson v. Pollet,
416 P.2d 381, 383-S4 (Alaska 1966); Charles
A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2716, at 643 (1983). For purposes of
reviewing the trial court's grant of summary
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judgment, we examine Metcalfe Investments'
proffered evidence to determine whether it
raises genuine issues of material fact
Ray Metcalfe is the president and sole
shareholder of Metcalfe Investments, Inc., a
real estate brokerage firm. Metcalfe Investments specializes in the sale of homes acquired by the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development The company attracts potential buyers with extensive advertising. People who call in response to the
ads have their names placed on a list of
people in the Anchorage area who are interested in purchasing residential property.
Toward the end of December 1990, Ray
Metcalfe hired Linda Garrison (Garrison) to
work for Metcalfe Investments as an independent contractor. Metcalfe told her that
she would be responsible for paying her own
federal income taxes, social security, workers' compensation, and unemployment insurance.
Garrison's job was primarily to sell real
estate for the company. She was to do so
from the list of names generated by company
advertising and to add to the list as new
contacts came into the office. Metcalfe told
her how the list had been developed and how
to maintain it. He also asserts that he told
her that the list was company property and
that she could not use it or take it with her in
the event of her departure.
Metcalfe claims that he instructed Garrison that if she left Metcalfe Investments, she
would receive no commissions on sales made
to customers she had worked with if those
sales were completed after her termination.
Further, she would have to "refrain from
participating in sales to any potential buyers
who had made first contact with Metcalfe
Investments, Inc. during the term of her
employment" unless Metcalfe granted permission to do so. The division of any commissions from transactions in closing at the
time of her departure would be negotiated
and subject to agreement between the two of
them.
According to Metcalfe, Garrison acknowledged that she fully understood the requirement that she refrain from contacting
Metcalfe Investments' customers after her

departure, and she accepted it as a ( w
tion of her employment While Met^T
admits that there was no discussion ^ e
how long this agreement would rem^
effect, he assumed that it would last for ^
year after Garrison left Metcalfe l n v ^ e
ments. He believed that Garrison had
similar understanding because of the n a w
of the Anchorage real estate market and
Metcalfe Investments' manner of doin
business. Garrison denies the existence 0f
any such agreement
While working as an independent contrac.
tor, Garrison initially was paid solely on a
commission basis (fifty percent of all commit
sions). Shortly thereafter, Garrison asked
Metcalfe to make her a salaried employee so
that she could have a reliable source of income every month. Metcalfe agreed to pay
Garrison a salary of $4,800 per month in
addition to a productivity bonus to be determined in Metcalfe's discretion. Metcalfe recounts that after numerous discussions between himself, Garrison, and the company
bookkeeper, it was agreed that Garrison
would receive as a bonus whatever was left
over after Metcalfe Investments took its fifty
percent share of all sales commissions earned
on property sold as a result of Garrison's
efforts and covered Garrison's salary of
$4,800 per month and the costs of having
made her an employee. These costs included
workers' compensation, unemployment insurance, all employer's matching funds for social
security, Medicare and other incidental
items.
During the period of negotiations Garrison
had been receiving her salary of $4,800 plus a
bonus of a full fifty percent of her sales
commissions over $9,600. Metcalfe alleges
that he realized that he had overpaid Garrison from February through September based
on the bonus arrangement which was ultimately devised. Therefore, according to
Metcalfe, Garrison's subsequent paychecks
were held to the minimum $4,800 until Metcalfe Investments recouped the employer's
share of the taxes and contributions and untQ
a $4,800 reserve was created to pay her
salary in a month when she might earn no
commissions. Garrison denies that she ever

METCALFE INVESTM1 *TS, INC. v, GARRISON
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agreed to have her commissions reduced by
the costs of making her an employee.
When Metcalfe later hired another employee to assist Garrison with her administrative duties, he reduced Garrison's share of
her commissions from fifty percent to forty
percent to pay the new employee's wages.
Metcalfe also deducted certain legal fees
from Garrison's commissions when a client
sued Garrison and Metcalfe Investments.
Metcalfe maintains that Garrison was paid
all of the salary and bonuses due to her on
January 15, 1992. Garrison resigned that
same day. The next day, Garrison opened
All Alaska Realestate Investments (AAR).
She placed an ad in the Anchorage Daily
News classified section announcing the opening of her new office and informing the public that she was now with AAR. Garrison
admits to having notified a few potential
customers with whom she had been working
of her new affiliation so that they would have
a choice of continuing to work with her or
with another broker at Metcalfe Investments.
Garrison also claims that when her clients
called Metcalfe Investments, Metcalfe refused to advise the callers of her new business and telephone number.
Metcalfe alleges that at least five people on
Metcalfe's list subsequently made purchases
through AAR in violation of the noncompetition agreement. Metcalfe also asserts that
some of these people originally had the properties shown to them by Metcalfe Investments employees other than Garrison.
When Garrison resigned, the reserve account created in August 1991 held $3,343.10.
Metcalfe instructed the bookkeeper not to
pay this amount to Garrison because she had
taken Metcalfe Investments' customers.
Garrison claims that she only contacted Metcalfe Investments' customers with whom she
had worked personally.
Garrison filed suit in district court against
Metcalfe Investments to recover the balance
of her reserve account and other monies she
claimed Metcalfe Investments owed to her.
Metcalfe Investments denied the claim and
1. Garrison provisionally waived her claim for the
commission and legal expenses in order to obtain

Alaska

1359

56 (Alaska 1996)

filed a counterclaim for commissions collected by Garrison after starting AAR. Approximately eighteen months later, Metcalfe Investments filed a new action in the superior
court against Garrison, her husband, and
AAR. This complaint alleged that Garrison
had breached her employment contract by
contacting potential buyers from Metcalfe Investments' list, that AAR was unjustly enriched when it received commissions that
should have gone to Metcalfe Investments,
and that all three defendants intentionally
interfered with Metcalfe Investments' prospective economic advantage or contractual
relations. The defendants answered, Garrison filed a counterclaim re-asserting the
claims for unpaid wages, and the cases were
consolidated in the superior court
Following preliminary discovery, Garrison
moved for summary judgment on all issues.
Garrison's husband, David, and AAR joined
the motion through their separate counsel.
Metcalfe Investments opposed summary
judgment and submitted a number of supporting affidavits, as well as a list of six
genuine issues of fact which it argued should
preclude the entry of summary judgment.
The court found that Garrison was entitled
to summary judgment on her wage claim and
awarded her the employer's contribution to
unemployment insurance ($814.20), social security and Medicare ($4,920.76), and workers'
compensation premiums ($1,011.62). The
court also awarded Garrison $88122 as the
undisputed balance of the reserve account.
It awarded Garrison an additional penalty of
$14,400 for improper withholding of her pay
under AS 23.05.140(d). The court reserved
for trial Garrison's claims for reimbursement
of the deduction for attorney's fees and for
an unpaid commission on a sale. The court
denied Metcalfe Investments' contract claim
on the ground that the noncompetition agreement was too vague to be enforced. Finally,
the court granted summary judgment to Garrison's husband and AAR on all claims
against them.
Final judgment was entered on all issues
in favor of Garrison, her husband, and AAR.1
This appeal followed.
a final judgment,
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III. DISCUSSIOH
A. Standard of Review
[2,3] We review the superior court's
grant of summary judgment de novo. Nielson v. Benton, 903 ?2d 1049, 1052 (Alaska
1995). The judgment will be affirmed only if
no genuine issues of material fact exist and
the moving parties are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Wright v. State, 824 P.2d
718, 720 (Alaska 1992). We will consider any
matter in the record that indicates the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
American Restaurant Group v. Clark, 889
P.2d 595, 597-98 (Alaska 1995). Finally, the
non-moving party is entitled to have the record reviewed in the light most favorable to it
and to have all reasonable inferences drawn
in its favor. Wilson v. Pollet, 416 P.2d at
381-84.2
B. Garrison Is Not Entitled to Summary
Judgment on Her Claims for Back
Wages and Penalties.
[4,5] The court granted Garrison summary judgment on her claim for back wages
and awarded her treble damages under AS
23.05.140(d). While she may prevail on her
wage claim at trial, she is not entitled to
2.

In its argument before this court, Metcalfe Investments relies upon many facts that were not
presented to the trial court until after its ruling
granting summary judgment to Garrison and
AAR. Garrison argues that this court should not
consider the affidavits that Metcalfe Investments
presented for the first time in support of its
motion for reconsideration of the trial court's
decision granting summary judgment. Garrison
cites State Dep't of Natural Resources v. Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 856 P.2d 766, 776
(Alaska 1993) (post-trial affidavit could not be
considered) and Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343,
347 n. 4 (Alaska 1988) (appraisal appended to
opposition to proposed findings and conclusions
submitted before final decision made was properly part of record but could be given no evidentiary value). A number of courts in other jurisdictions have held that the trial court is not
required to consider affidavits filed for the first
time with a motion for reconsideration of a decision granting summary judgment. See, e.g., Bukulmez v. Hertz Corp., 710 P.2d 1117, 1121 (Colo.
App.1985) (Civil Rule 56 does not allow for affidavits to be filed after court has rendered judgment), rev'd on other grounds, Blue Cross of Western New York v. Bukulmez, 736 P.2d 834, 838-39
(Colo. 1987); Wells v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
525 N.E.2d 1127, 1129-30 (III.App.1988) (court

summary judgment
Furthermore, AQ
23.05.140(d) does not support an award
treble damages.3
According to Metcalfe, after Garrison K*.
came a salaried employee, the amount of u
bonus was to be determined solely ^ J
discretion. Metcalfe recalls telling Garriso
that he "promised to be fair" but that hi
decision would be based upon a number f
factors, including "costs to the employer re.
suiting from changing her status to one of
employee." He alleges that some months
later, he and Garrison agreed that her bonuses would be the net of one-half of commig.
sions received as a result of her efforts, less
all the costs of having her as an employee
including her base salary and "incidental
costs which the employer was required to
pay as a result of her status as an employee.''
Garrison disputes the nature of the agreement over commissions, claiming among other things that Metcalfe retroactively reduced
her commissions.
Metcalfe does not dispute that the law
prohibits an employer from deducting the
employer's share of workers' compensation
premiums and social security, Medicare, and
unemployment taxes from an employee's
wages.4 Wages include commissions and boproperly rejected affidavit attached to motion for
reconsideration).
We need not reach this issue because Metcalfe's initial opposition to the motion for summary judgment included an affidavit containing
all of the critical allegations regarding the covenant not to compete and Garrison's bonus arrangement.
3. If Garrison prevails on her wage claim at trial,
the trial court has the discretion to impose a
statutory penalty pursuant to AS 23.05.140(d).
See Klondike Industries Corp. v. Gibson, 741 P.2d
1161, 1171 (Alaska 1987). However, that penalty is not "automatic" as was erroneously argued
to the trial court by Garrison's counsel. Nor is
Garrison correct in her characterization of AS
23.05.140(d) as a "treble damages" provision.
AS 23.05.140(d) provides that an "employer may
be required to pay the employee a penalty in the
amount of the employee's regular wage, salary,
or other compensation from the time of demand
to the time of payment, or for 90 working days,
whichever is the lesser amount"
4. For example, AS 23.20.165(a) prohibits an employer from deducting the employer's share of
unemployment taxes from an employee's wages.
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noises. See, e.g., AS 23.20.530(a) (defining
wages as aall remuneration for service from
whatever source, including ... commissions
[and] bonuses."). Garrison argues that Metcalfe deducted the employer's share of these
taxes from her commissions, and is therefore
liable to repay her those amounts.
According to Metcalfe, the parties agreed
to a payment plan under which Garrison's
bonus would be defined as fifty percent of
her sales commissions less all expenses of
her being an employee. We cannot say as a
matter of law that an employer and employee
may never agree to payment of a discretionary bonus on such a basis. The question of
whether the parties agreed to payment of a
discretionary bonus under the terms described by Metcalfe cannot be determined on
summary judgment and will have to be answered at trial.

ployment The evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to Metcalfe Investments,
indicates that the agreement contained terms
which were sufficiently well defined, and thus
Garrison was not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that the agreement was
too vague.
2. The noncompetition agreement is not
void for lack of a geographic or durational limitation.
Garrison argues that the noncompetition
agreement lacked any geographical or durational limitation. She further claims that
there is no way for the court to determine
such limitations, rendering the agreement
unenforceable.

[8-10] In Data Management, Inc. v.
Greene, 757 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1988), we held
that so long as an overly broad covenant not
[6] Metcalfe Investments has raised a to compete was drafted in good faith, the
genuine issue of material fact as to what the court would make reasonable alterations to
parties agreed Garrison's bonus would be. render it enforceable. Id. at 64-65. HowevWe must therefore reverse the trial court's er, it is not necessary to turn to Data Mangrant of summary judgment and remand for agement to imply a geographical or durationtrial so that the jury may determine what the al limitation to the agreement before us,
salary agreement was and whether it violated because this agreement is enforceable even
without such limits. This is not the type of
state or federal law.
noncompetition agreement that courts typiC. Garrison Was Not Entitled to Sum- cally see, limiting a former employee's ability
mary Judgment on Metcalfe Invest-to engage in a trade or profession within a
ments* Claim that She Violated the given area for some period of time. Instead,
it is an agreement that left Garrison free to
Covenant Not to Compete.
set up a carbon copy of Metcalfe Investments
The trial court found that the noncompeti- right down the street if she wished. The
tion agreement described by Ray Metcalfe only thing she was prohibited from doing was
was too vague to be enforced.
expropriating information and customers that
Metcalfe Investments had procured at its
1. The noncompetition agreement wasown expense. Thus the lack of a geographinot impermissibly vague.
cal limitation is irrelevant because the cove[7] The trial court had before it Met- nant was not a blanket prohibition on compecalfe's version of the agreement, as well as tition, but rather a selective restraint on
supporting affidavits from other Metcalfe In- doing business with people who were potenvestments employees. This evidence indicat- tial Metcalfe Investments customers at the
ed that Garrison had agreed not to make use time of her termination. Such restrictive
of Metcalfe Investments' client list after de- covenants are subject to a less stringent test
parting and not to participate in sales to of reasonableness than blanket prohibitions
potential buyers who had first made contact of competition. See Restatement (Second) of
with Metcalfe Investments during her em- Cmtracts § 188, cmt. g (1981) ("[A] restraint
Similarly, AS 23.30.245 makes an agreement by
an employee to pay a portion of workers' compensation premiums invalid, and provides for the

imposition of criminal penalties on the employer
for making such a deduction from the employee's
pay.
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is easier to justify . . . if the restraint is
limited to the taking of his former employer's
customers as contrasted with competition in
general"); Corroon & Black of III, Inc. v.
Magner, 145 IlLApp.3d 151, 98 HLDec. 663,
671, 494 N.E.2d 785, 793 (1986) (activity restraints subject to less stringent test of reasonableness than geographic restraints). We
conclude that the noncompetition agreement
is not rendered unenforceable by the lack of
a geographical or durational limitation. The
limited scope of the activity restraint is narrowly drawn to protect Metcalfe Investments' interests in its customer lists.5
3. The noncompetition agreement does
not violate the statute of frauds.
t i l l The question of whether an oral noncompetition agreement of unlimited duration
violates the statute of frauds is one of first
impression in Alaska. In Howarth v. First
National Bank of Anchorage, 540 P.2d 486,
491 (Alaska 1975), we held that a contract is
not subject to the statute of frauds if it may
be fully performed within one year from the
time it is made. "In order for the statute of
frauds to apply, it must appear that the
parties intended, when they made the contract, that it should not be performed within
the year." Id (citations omitted); see also
AS 09.25.010.

frauds); Arthur L. Corbin, 2 Corbin on Co^
tracts § 453, at 568 (1950); Walter H.E. J ^
ger, 3 WUliston On Contracts § 495, at ^
(3d ed. 1960); 72 AmJur^d Statute of
Frauds § 30 (1974); Hall v. Solomon, 23 ^
876, 878 (Conn.1892); Frantz v. Parke, i lx
Idaho 1005, 1008, 729 ?2d 1068, 1071 (App,
1986); Hampton u Caldwell, 95 Ark. 337
129 S.W. 816, 816 (1910); Barash v. Robin.
son, 142 Wash. 118, 252 P. 680, 683 (1927),
The rationale for this rule is that if the
promisor were to die within a year, the
promise not to compete would be fully per.
formed. Corbin, supra at 569. A promise to
forebear from competition is distinguished
from an affirmative promise, where the contract might well be terminated by death, but
the performance would still be incomplete.
M a t 569-70.
[12,13] We agree with the authorities cited above that a promise to refrain from an
activity, such as using customer lists in a new
business, for an unlimited period of time is
not subject to the statute of frauds. The
noncompetition agreement in this case is
thus enforceable despite the fact that it was
not in writing.
4. The noncompetition agreement does
not injure the public interest

In his sworn affidavit, Metcalfe stated that
there was no discussion of a time limitation
on the noncompetition agreement; however,
he assumed it would last for only a year.
While it appears to be a question of first
impression in Alaska, it is well-settled elsewhere that a promise to forebear or not to
compete for an indefinite period of time is
not within the statute of frauds. See, e.g.,
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 130,
cmt. b. and illus. 9 (1981) (taking position
that even promise to forebear for specific
number of years is not within statute of

Garrison argues that any agreement restricting the freedom of real estate purchasers to choose a broker injures the public
interest. She also notes that because Alaska
lawyers are prohibited from restraining the
rights of other lawyers to take clients with
them if they leave their firms, real estate
brokers should operate under the same rules.
See Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 5.6(a). She argues that "a buyer of real
estate should have the same freedom to

5. This is not to say that all restraints on contacting former customers will be found to be reasonable. For instance, if a business is so large that
a restraint on contacting former clients would
amount to a bar prohibiting the employee from
practicing his or her specialty, the court will
require the restraint to be drafted more narrowly. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements
Not to Compete. 73 Harv.L.Rev. 625, 677 (1960).

A covenant not to contact former customers will
also be unreasonable if the former employee did
not have access to confidential information. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188, illus. 7. If
the trier of fact finds that a noncompetition
agreement did exist between Garrison and Metcalfe Investments, Garrison remains free to challenge the reasonableness of the restraint on this
ground.

--*- ^vuaiMENTS, INC. v. GARRISON

Alaska 1363

Cite at 919 P.2d 13S6 (Alaska 1996)

jjoose a realtor as a person would have to
jioose an attorney/' *

D. Garrison Was Not Entitled to Sum-

mary Judgment on Metcalfe Investmerits'
Tort Claims.
Covenants not to compete for real estate
In her motion for summary judgment, Garokers have been found to be enforceable
ad unenforceable, depending upon the facts rison moved "for an order granting her sumthe case.7 Covenants have been struck mary judgment on her claim for wages due
jown because they were too broad in time and on claims brought against her by Metscope or because there were no trade calfe Investments, Inc." In her supporting
ets or threats of unfair competition in- memorandum, Garrison's counsel framed
Dived, but never because noncompetition only two issues for resolution:
This consolidated action concerns a sinaents for real estate brokers amounted
gle dispute . . . regarding Garrison's claim
a per se injury to the public interest See
for unpaid wages and Metcalfe Investcited supra, note 7.
ment's [sic] counterclaim for damages re[14] Garrison has provided us with no
sulting from Garrison's alleged breach of
persuasive reason or legal precedent for her
an oral employment contract
proposition that this covenant not to compete
The memorandum in support of Garrison's
constitutes a violation of public policy. Acmotion never mentioned nor argued Metcalfe
cordingly, we find that such an agreement
Investments' tort claims. When AAR joined
| does not injure the public interest 8
the motion for summary judgment, it too
We conclude that there are genuine issues failed to specifically address the tort claims.
of material fact that remain to be resolved When Metcalfe Investments filed its opposiI regarding the covenant not to compete, both tion, the briefing again only addressed Garri1 as to its existence and as to its terms. Tak- son's claims for back wages and the noncom\ ing the facts as Metcalfe Investments alleges, petition agreement The tort claims were
Garrison is not entitled to judgment as a not addressed by any party or the court at
the July 13, 1994 hearing on the motion.
matter of law on this question.
6. Courts have upheld covenants not to compete
when applied to doctors on many occasions. See
Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Validity and
Construction of Contractual Restrictions on Right
of Medical Practitioner to Practice, Incident to
Employment Agreement, 62 A.L.R.3d 1014 (1975).
7. See Rector-Philhps-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253
Ark. 750, 489 S.W.2d 1, 2-3 (1973) (refusing to
enforce covenant not to compete for three years
in employer's county where there was no evidence employee attempted to use employer's
confidential information); Welles v. OConnell,
23 Conn.Supp. 335, 183 A.2d 287, 288-89 (1962)
(upholding covenant not to compete within town
for two years); Dalrymple v. Hagood, 246 Ga.
235, 271 S.E.2d 149,' 150-51 (1980) (upholding
covenant not to compete in same county for
three years); Mike Bajalia, Inc. v. Pike, 226 Ga.
131, 172 S E.2d 676, 678 (1970) (upholding covenant not to compete within the county for eighteen months); Vander Werfv. Zumca Realty Co.,
59 lU.App.2d 173, 208 N.E.2d 74, 77 (1965)
(striking covenant not to compete for two years
within five miles of employer's offices where no
trade secrets involved and no client enticement
occurred); Blackwell v. E.M. Helides, Jr., Inc.,
368 Mass. 225, 331 N E.2d 54, 56 (1975) (upholding covenant not to compete for three years
m multiple towns where employee had access to

files with confidential information on properties
not available to public); Abramson v. Blackman,
340 Mass. 714, 166 N.E.2d 729, 730 (1960)
(striking covenant not to use information from
employer's files or information gamed verbally
for indefinite period); Dunfey Realty Co. v. £nwnght, 101 N.H. 195, 138 A.2d 80, 82-83 (1957)
(refusing to uphold covenant not to compete for
three vears within local area); Steinfeld v. Hau~
sen, 180 Misc. 295, 40 N.Y.S.2d 683, 684 (Sup.
1943) (upholding covenant not to compete for
one year within twenty square blocks from emplover's office), modified, 269 A.D. 336, 55
N.Y.S.2d 722 (App.Dep't 1945); Cohen Realty,
Inc v. Mannick, 817 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla.App.
1991) (refusing to enforce covenant that contamed no limit on geography and too long a time
limit); Pancake Realty Co. v. Harber, 137 W.Va.
605, 73 S.E.2d 438, 443 (1952) (striking covenant not to compete for one year without territorial limits).
8. Gamson also makes a claim that she could
have been violating state law if she refused to
work with a buyer because of the noncompetition
agreement. She cites provisions prohibiting discrimination in housing on the basis of race, sex,
and disability. See AS 18.80.240(1) and 12 AAC
64 130(19) It is difficult to see how her compliance with the noncompetition agreement would
cause her to violate Alaska's housing discrimination laws.
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[15] Based on this record, we conclude
that Metcalfe Investments' tort claims were
not properly before the trial court for summary adjudication. Our Civil Rules require
the moving party to file with a motion for
summary judgment "a memorandum showing
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Alaska R.Civ.P. 56(c). Garrison and AAR
did not even attempt to do so on Metcalfe
Investments' tort claims. While they did
include language in their motion that indicated they sought summary judgment on all
issues, Rule 56(c) places on the moving party
the burden of proving that there is no issue
of material fact and entitlement to judgment
as a matter of law. Indeed, Rule 56(e) states
that:
When a motion for summary judgment is
made and supported as provided in this
rule . . . the adverse party's response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Alaska R.Civ.P. 56(e) (emphasis added).
Only after the moving party meets this
burden is the nonmoving party obligated to
demonstrate the existence of genuine material factual disputes or that the moving party
is not entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Alaska R.Civ.P. 56(e). Because Garrison and AAR never met this initial burden as
to the tort claims, it was improper for the
trial court to grant summary judgment on
them.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because of our resolution of these issues, it
is not necessary to reach the other errors
asserted by the parties in this appeal. The
judgment of the trial court is REVERSED
and REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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Defendant was cited for fishing with undersized gillnet The First Judicial District
Court, Ketchikan, George L. Gucker, J., djg.
missed case, and state appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Bryner, C.J., held that charge
was not unconstitutionally vague.
Reversed.
1. Constitutional Law <s=>258(2)
Criminal statute violates due process
when it is so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.
U.S.CJL ConstAmend. 14.
2. Fish <s»15
Charge alleging that defendant fished
with gillnet containing inadequate mesh size
was not void for vagueness; definition of
"stretched measure" in regulation described
reasonably accurate way of determining
mesh size either before or after fishing, and
defendant failed to demonstrate why he could
not have proceeded with exact method of
measurement specified in challenged regulation prior to fishing with net U.S.CJL
Const.Amend. 14; Alaska Admin. Code title
5, §§ 27.131(f), 39.975(11).
3. Automobiles <3»332
Motorist may be convicted of driving
while intoxicated (DWI) for driving with
blood-alcohol level in excess of specific limit,
even though no precise method of determining blood-alcohol content is readily available
to driver until postarrest breath test is administered.
4. Criminal Law <3=>13.1(1)
Defendant who is moving to dismiss
criminal charge for vagueness bears burden

